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EEOC V. LUCE AND THE MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The job search is both a familiar and exhaustive process for many
individuals. Imagine finally receiving a job offer after countless hours
of reviewing the classifieds, writing cover letters to prospective em-
ployers, sending resumes, and interviewing. At some point during the
hiring process, an employer presents a contract highlighting terms of
employment that requires an employee's signature as a condition of
employment. Many prospective employees would not think twice
about agreeing to such a preliminary matter.1 Some may attempt to
read the terms thoroughly but remain unsure of what terms to chal-
lenge and ultimately defer to the employer's hiring knowledge.2
Others may read the terms with some hesitation but fail to ask ques-
tions out of fear of either sounding naive or of jeopardizing the job
offer.3
Suppose the employer terminates or demotes the same employee in
a few years due to the employee's age or race. Or perhaps the em-
ployee was sexually harassed in the workplace. In either case, the em-
ployee feels wronged by the employer and now wishes to pursue his or
her rights in court. Consulting the employment contract (and perhaps
an attorney), the employee is surprised to learn that the right to en-
force civil rights in a judicial forum was waived. Included in the em-
ployment contract is a mandatory arbitration clause, requiring the
employee to arbitrate any claims arising out of employment or termi-
nation of employment.
1. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q., 637, 676-77 (1996) (noting that
few employees read their contracts and even if they did, they would not have the "legal sophisti-
cation" to understand the consequences of binding arbitration); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Labor/Employment Law: Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow
Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENyV. U. L. REV., 1017, 1037 (1996) (noting that at the time of
hire, employees lack bargaining power and thus often agree to such terms without giving them
much thought); T. Shawn Taylor, More Employers Force Workers into Arbitration - But Is It
Fair?, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2002, § 5, at 5 (article regarding an employee pursuing a racial dis-
crimination claim against his employer but had accepted the job position before learning that he
was required to sign an arbitration agreement).
2. See supra note 1.
3. Id.
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What does arbitration mean and what are the consequences of for-
going a jury trial? The use of mandatory arbitration clauses in em-
ployment, consumer, and franchise contracts has generated a great
deal of controversy among legislatures, courts, administrative agen-
cies, and scholars. 4 Critics of mandatory arbitration agreements argue
that employees should not be forced to waive their right to a jury trial
and that arbitration lacks the procedural advantages of litigation.5
Proponents of mandatory arbitration contracts assert that arbitration
provides both employers and employees with a less costly, less compli-
cated, and more efficient alternative to litigation.6 This sharply di-
vided debate continues to generate litigation regarding the
enforceability of arbitration claims.7 The clear trend of judicial pref-
erence toward alternative dispute resolution has encouraged the use
of arbitration in multiple settings even though issues regarding arbi-
tration, including what is arbitrable, continually challenge courts.8
4. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 637; Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary
Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employ-
ment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
5. Ross Runkel, Arbitration of Employment Disputes: The New Privatization of the Judicial
System, LawMemo.com, at http://www.lawmemo.com/emp/articleslarb.htm (last visited July 8,
2003). This article provides a general introduction to arbitration, including the history of arbitra-
tion as it relates to both unions and the individual employee, and describes the anatomy of a
typical employment arbitration, the legal issues surrounding arbitration, and the pros and cons of
arbitration.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally Runkel, supra note 5 (noting that the debates regarding the use of arbitration
clauses have resulted in a "significant amount of litigation"); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE
JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 585 (2000) (emphasizing that the use
of arbitration has resulted in a number of new challenges brought by employees regarding the
enforceability of arbitration clauses). Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., however, is a re-
cent and pivotal decision in which the United States Supreme Court held that an arbitrator can
rule on arbitrability issues. 537 U.S. 79 (2002). The following list represents recent cases illus-
trating some issues courts currently face regarding arbitration: Finley Lines Joint Protective
Board v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 312 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the arbitration
board did not exceed its authority in determining the probative value of a polygraph report);
Bond v. Twin Cities Carpenters Pension Fund, 307 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that an ER-
ISA plan's fee-splitting clause within the arbitration provision violated ERISA); Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees, and Wabash Federation v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis,
307 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2002) (determining that the trial court erred in vacating the arbitration
award); Providence Journal Co. v. Providence Newspaper Guild, 308 F.3d 129 (lst Cir. 2002)
(finding that because there is a presumption in favor of arbitration, the employer was not re-
lieved of its contractual obligation to arbitrate despite the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement); Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
an arbitrator's decision is strong evidence of no Title VII violation); Riccard v. Prudential Insur-
ance, 307 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002) (determining when an employee was a member of NASD
for arbitration purposes); Chicago Teachers Union v. Ill. Education Labor Relations Board, 778
N.E.2d 1232 (111. App. 2002) (finding the arbitrator's award binding); District 318 Service Em-
ployees Ass'n v. Independent School District No. 318, 649 N.w.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
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This Note will discuss the recent Ninth Circuit case EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps9 and its role in undermining the right of
an employee to litigate employment discrimination claims. In Part II,
this Note will explore the origins of this dispute by first discussing the
history of arbitration in general and then, more specifically, the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA). In addition, Part II will highlight the
more relevant cases regarding arbitration that serve as a backdrop to
Luce.
Part III of this Note will analyze Luce and argue that the case was
wrongly decided in light of the issues presented, the legislative history
and purpose behind the Civil Rights Act, and the misapplication of
case law. Moreover, this Note will demonstrate that Luce is another
example of the judicial push to clear court dockets of unwanted em-
ployment cases.
Part IV of this Note will discuss the consequences of Luce as it ap-
plies to employees, employers, and the concept of arbitration in gen-
eral. This Note will demonstrate how arbitration is partial to the
employer and why an employee should not be forced to waive his or
her right to a trial by peers. In addition, this Note will argue that the
characteristics that make arbitration an attractive alternative to litiga-
tion are negated as arbitration becomes an increasingly more complex
area of law. Part IV of this Note will also point out that mediation, an
alternative to both arbitration and litigation, provides a more equally
balanced environment for resolving employment disputes.
Part V of this Note will conclude that Luce was incorrectly decided
and that the Ninth Circuit's decision is an example of "judicial legisla-
tion." Part V of this Note will stress that an employee should not be
forced to waive his or her right to trial by jury. In addition, Part V of
this Note will emphasize that arbitration strongly favors the employer
and that other alternative dispute resolution methods, such as media-
tion, represent a more voluntary approach to resolving employment
disputes.
(holding that the issue was not subject to arbitration because the terms were not part of the
collective bargaining agreement); and Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W.3d 830 (Tex.
App. 2002) (holding a non-signatory cannot enforce an arbitration agreement).
9. 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002).
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II. HISTORY OF ARBITRATION
A. General Overview
Although Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)IO has become a
hot topic in the legal community, ADR is "as old as humanity itself."'1
Beginning with English settlement in North America, settlers utilized
an alternative form of dispute resolution in order to avoid the high
cost and complexity associated with the courts. 12 Over the years, the
ADR industry has grown and developed with society's continued de-
sire to seek a less costly alternative to litigation.13 Arbitration is just
one form of ADR that has emerged as a popular method in resolving
disputes1 4 Arbitration is generally defined as:
widely used in commercial and labor-management disagreements,
involv[ing] the submission of the dispute to a third party who ren-
ders a decision after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence. It
is less formal and less complex and often can be concluded more
quickly than court proceedings. In its most common form, Binding
Arbitration, the parties select the arbitrator and are bound by the
decision, either by prior agreement or by statute. In Last Offer Ar-
bitration, the arbitrator is required to choose between the final posi-
tions of the two parties. In labor-management disputes, Grievance
Arbitration has traditionally been used to resolve grievances under
the provisions of labor contracts. More recently, Interest Arbitra-
tion has been used when collective bargaining breaks down in the
public sector, where strikes may be unlawful. 15
The financial burdens, time constraints, and overcrowding of court
dockets associated with litigation have continued to motivate Ameri-
cans to find alternative forms of dispute resolution such as arbitra-
10. See STONE, supra note 8, at 5. The author notes that the common characteristic of all
ADR methods is that each form differs from the dispute process of litigation. Id.
11. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, IN-
TERNATIONALIZATION 3 (1992) (provides an extensive overview of the past, present, and future
aspects and issues relating to American arbitration).
12. Paul H. Haagen, Preface to ARBITRATION Now: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS
RENEWAL, AND INVIOORATION, at xv (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999) (general overview of the devel-
opment of arbitration in the United States, highlighting current issues and trends); MACNEIL,
supra note 11, at 3 (discussing how every generation within the legal academy rediscovers ADR
despite the long historical presence of ADR).
13. STONE, supra note 8, at 5. The term ADR includes processes such as: mediation, private
arbitration, mediation-arbitration ("med-arb"), third-party evaluation, appraisals, fact-finding
panels, mini-trials, court-mandated settlement conferences, court-mandated arbitration, court-
mandated mediation, summary jury trials, small claims courts, federal magistrates and special
masters, and specialty courts like housing courts or patent courts. Id.
14. See generally STONE, supra note 8, at iii, 303-04.
15. See STONE, supra note 8, at 5-6 (citing Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution
and Public Policy).
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tion.16 Organizations or businesses in the same trade or industry
typically utilize arbitration to resolve disputes.' 7 Although arbitration
has primarily been used to resolve commercial disputes, the use of
arbitration clauses has increased in a variety of contexts, including
"many residential leases, medical informed consent forms, banking
and credit card agreements, attorney-client fee arrangements, health
maintenance organization agreements, and residential housing associ-
ation charters."' 8
1. Use of Arbitration in the Employment Context
Arbitration has commonly been used to resolve labor-management
disputes.' 9 Collective bargaining agreements typically establish for-
mal grievance procedures, providing an "orderly method" for a union
and management to negotiate contractual issues.20 Arbitration is used
as a final step in this process if an agreement is not reached.2' Al-
though employers initially resisted the use of arbitration, approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of collective bargaining agreements
presently utilize arbitration to settle contract negotiations. 22 In the
union context, however, grievance arbitration is not the substitute for
litigation but is the alternative to industrial strife.23 The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the role of arbitration in the collective
bargaining setting as "a major influence on the law of arbitration in
other areas [of law] as well."'24
The use of arbitration in the non-union sector of employment grew
in response to a number of new employment statutes enacted by Con-
16. Haagen, supra note 12, at xv (explaining that arbitration has played a vital role with busi-
ness disputes but not with civil disputes): MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 3 (in particular, the com-
mercial and financial world turned to forms of arbitration in order to reduce costs of litigation).
17. Haagen, supra note 12, at xv (For instance, arbitration remains an important fixture in the
securities industry.). See generally James J. Moylan & Laren Ukman, Arbitration of Customer-
Securities Broker Disputes, 75 ILL. B.J. 374 (1987).
18. STONE, supra note 8, at iii.
19. Id. at 303-04, 456 (stating that arbitration has been a prominent feature of American col-
lective bargaining agreements since World War II and has become the primary method for
resolving collective bargaining issues in the United States).
20. Id. at 303-04.
21. Id.
22. STONE, supra note 8, at 456: see generally Runkel, supra note 5 (stating that nearly all
collective bargaining agreements include an agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes).
23. Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40
ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 84-85 (1996) ("grievance arbitration is the quid pro quo for the union's
agreement not to strike," collective bargaining agreements provide general agreements regard-
ing wages, hours, working conditions rather than individual employee rights: and thus. arbitra-
tion plays a pivotal role in 6iorkplace seif-government and has often been referred to as the law
of "the shop"): see generally Runkel, supra note 5.
24. STONE. supra note 8. at 456-57.
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gress between 1963 and 1993.25 Statutes such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (Title VII),26 the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), 27
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 28 the Equal
Pay Act (EPA), 29 and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 30
provided important new protections for individual employees in the
workplace. The Civil Rights Act was also amended in 1991 to allow
jury trials in Title VII cases and to expand remedies available to in-
clude compensatory and punitive damages. 31 These new statutes
therefore provided the individual employee "a greater number of stat-
utory and common-law claims than ever before. '32
As a result, both employers and courts faced an influx of employ-
ment disputes. 33 Employers sought out arbitration in response to this
increase in litigation to reduce the cost, time, and large jury verdicts
associated with litigation. 34 To facilitate the use of arbitration, em-
ployers began to include a mandatory arbitration 35 clause as a part of
the employment contract. 36 This clause requires both the employer
and the employees to agree to submit any employment disputes to an
25. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000).
27. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
29. Id. § 206.
30. Id. § 2601.
31. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
32. Id.
33. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RE-
LATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 49 (1994), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.
edu/library/e-archive/gov-reports/dunlop[DunlopFinalReport.pdf (last visited July 8, 2003). The
report states:
[E]mployment litigation has spiraled in the last two decades. The expansion of federal
and state discrimination laws and the growth in common law and statutory protection
against wrongful dismissal have provided employees with broader array of tools with
which to challenge employer behavior in court. In the federal courts alone, the number
of suits filed concerning employment grievances grew over 400 percent in the last two
decades.
Id. Alfred G. Feliu, The Scope of the FAA's Exclusion, ADR CURRENTS (American Arbitration
Ass'n), Winter 1996/1997, at 1 ("The burden of employment litigation on the courts has been
enormous and can be expected to grow in coming years"); Stuart L. Bass, What the Courts Say
About Mandatory Arbitration under Title VII Claims. FORDHAM URB. L.J. 30 (1999), reprinted in
ADR & THE LAW, at 30-31 (6th ed. 1999) (explaining employers' desire to utilize arbitration as
an alternative as a result of the influx of employment disputes).
34. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
35. A mandatory arbitration clause is also referred to as a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreement or a term-of-employment clause. See generally Reilly, supra note 4, at 1206.
36. Id.; Katherine Eddy, To Every Remedy a Wrong: The Confounding of Civil Liberties
Through Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 775
(2001).
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arbitrator and thereby waive their respective rights to a jury trial,37
unless impermissible by law.3s Although the agreement is typically in
boilerplate language, employers are required to make the terms clear
and unambiguous so that an employee can read and understand the
consequences. 39
2. Role of Arbitration Associations and the Process of Institutional
Arbitration
The arbitration clause usually provides that the arbitration proceed-
ings will be administered by the rules of an independent group such as
the American Arbitration Association (AAA).40 The AAA was
founded in the 1920s and has become a large national organization.
41
The AAA maintains a list of arbitrators both for general disputes and
for specialized areas of the law.42 The organization has also estab-
lished a standard set of arbitral rules and procedures. 43 For instance,
the AAA recommends the following model arbitration clause for em-
ployers to insert into employment contracts, personnel manuals or
policy statements, employment applications, or other agreements:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by
the American Arbitration Association under its National Rules for
the Resolution of Employment Disputes, and judgment upon the
award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered by any court
having jurisdiction thereof.44
37. Critics of mandatory arbitration agreements argue that an employee required to sign such
an agreement does not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive his or her right to trial by
jury. For a thorough discussion of this argument, see Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001) (arguing that courts have not applied the "traditional jury trial waiver
criteria" necessary to waive the fundamental right to a trial by jury).
38. See generally STONE, supra note 8, at 585.
39. Eddy, supra note 36, at 775.
40. See generally Runkel, supra note 5; see also STONE, supra note 8, at 304; Taylor, supra note
1, at 5. Other agencies include the National Arbitration Forum and JAMS, formerly Judicial,
Arbitration and Mediation Services.
41. American Arbitration Association (AAA), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=
15765 (last visited July 8, 2003).
42. STONE, supra note 8, at 304.
43. Id.
44. American Arbitration Association (AAA), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=
15727 & JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules Procedures\ADR_Guides\clausebook. html# Arbitra-
tion (last visited July 8, 2003). This site provides guidelines for drafting arbitration, mediation,
and negotiation clauses in various contexts.
The AAA's policy on employment ADR is guided by the state of existing law, as well
as its obligation to act in an impartial manner. In following the law, and in the interest
of providing an appropriate forum for the resolution of employment disputes, the Asso-
ciation administers dispute resolution programs which meet the due process standards
2003]
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The AAA also provides a list of recommendations to consider when
drafting a clear, unambiguous arbitration clause.45
If a dispute arises in the employment context, the employee sends a
written notice and a filing fee to the agency, such as the AAA, and the
agency gives the employer an opportunity to respond. 46 The process
of selecting an arbitrator depends on the terms of the clause. 47 While
some terms specify that the agency assigns an arbitrator, other situa-
tions require the parties to select an arbitrator.48
The arbitrator establishes a hearing or conference date.49 The ac-
tual hearing may vary in form, from a more formal proceeding, involv-
ing rules of evidence and other formal procedures similar to litigation,
to an informal discussion between parties. 50 The process typically
used, however, is found in some variation between these two ex-
tremes.51 More importantly, "arbitration is a creature of the parties
and the parties are free to shape the scope of arbitration and the pro-
cedures to be used in whatever way they please. ' '52
as outlined in its National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes and the
Due Process Protocol.
Id.
45. Id.
The clause might cover all disputes that may arise, or only certain types; [i]t could
specify only arbitration - giving a binding result - or also provide an opportunity for
non-binding negotiation or mediation. The arbitration clause should be signed by as
many potential parties to a future dispute as possible; [t]o be fully effective, "entry of
judgment" language in domestic cases is important; it is normally a good idea to state
whether a panel of one or three arbitrators is to be selected, and to include the place
where the arbitration will occur; [i]f the contract includes a general choice of law
clause, it may govern the arbitration proceeding. The consequences should be consid-
ered; [i]f the parties wish to exclude punitive damages, they should specifically so state:
[c]onsideration should be given to incorporating the AAA's Supplementary Procedures
for Large, Complex Disputes for potentially substantial or complicated cases; [t]he
drafter should keep in mind that the AAA has specialized rules for arbitration in the
construction, textile, patent, securities and certain other fields. If anticipated disputes
fall into any of these areas, the specialized rules should be considered for incorporation
in the arbitration clause. An experienced AAA administrative staff manages the
processing of cases under AAA rules; [t]he parties are free to customize and refine the
basic arbitration procedures to meet their particular needs. If the parties agree on a
procedure that conflicts with otherwise applicable AAA rules, the AAA will almost
always respect the wishes of the parties and will implement the agreement as written.
Id.
46. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
47. STONE, supra note 8, at 303.
48. Id.
49. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
50. STONE, supra note 8, at 303.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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An arbitrator usually makes a decision within thirty days after the
hearing, which may or may not be accompanied by a written deci-
sion.53 The arbitrator's decision is binding unless a party can show
that the award was obtained by "corruption, fraud, or undue means"
or that the arbitrator was partial, corrupt, guilty of misconduct, or ex-
ceeded his or her powers. 54 Judicial review of an arbitrator's decision
is therefore limited, and courts usually do not review the merits of a
dispute.55
3. Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the FAA
preempts state laws "hostile to arbitration,' 56 the courts have treated
the enforceability of arbitration agreements differently. 57 According
to the FAA, a party may challenge the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement under general contract defenses such as fraud, duress, and
unconscionability. 58 As a result, federal courts may not invalidate an
arbitration agreement under state arbitration provisions but must ap-
53. See generally Runkel, supra note 5; STONE, supra note 8, at 304.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2000) (grounds on which an arbitration award may be vacated;
part 3 describes misconduct as "refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown,
or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" part 4 states that the arbitrators
exceed their power when a "mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made."). See generally Runkel, supra note 5; STONE, supra note 8, at 304.
55. STONE, supra note 8, at 304.
56. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); see also Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 251 (2001); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
57. See generally Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the arbitration
agreement unconscionable under state law); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163
F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding the arbitration agreement unenforceable because the agree-
ment contained a fee-splitting provision and denied the plaintiff access to litigate his statutory
claims in court); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (finding an
arbitration clause as part of an employment contract as oppressive and unconscionable). But see
Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding an unsigned arbitration agreement
was supported by consideration); OPE Int'l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors., Inc., 258 F.3d 443
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the FAA preempted Louisana state law and thus the arbitration
agreement was enforceable); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding the state law that governed franchise agreements was preempted by the FAA and thus
the arbitration agreement was enforceable); Ritch v. Eaton, No. 02-7689, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24726 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2002) (finding the arbitration provision not unconscionable or unen-
forceable); Bd. Trs. of Cayuga County Cmty. Coll. v. Cayuga County Cmty. Coll. Faculty Ass'n,
750 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 2002) (New York Appellate Division reverses trial court's finding
that the arbitration agreement binding a third party would violate public policy).
58. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"): Southland
Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 (noting that grounds for revocation must be based on general contract
provisions and not laws specifically designated for arbitration agreements).
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ply "ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of con-
tracts" in determining the validity of an arbitration agreement.5 9 A
fortiori, a federal court's review of the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement will vary according to the applicable state contract law.
60
As mentioned, the legal, political, and academic communities re-
main sharply divided regarding arbitration in the employment con-
text.61 While employers embrace arbitration, 62 national organizations
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
63
59. Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 892 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
944 (1995); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
60. See cases cited supra note 59. National employers wishing to use arbitration agreements
are continually challenged when complying with individual state contract laws while maintaining
legally binding arbitration contracts. See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 407-08 (2000) ("a pro-
lific amount of scholarly criticism about . . . employers' use of mandatory arbitration has tran-
spired over the last decade."); Reilly supra note 4, at 1206-07 ("lively public policy debate among
legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, alternative dispute resolution providers, and legal
scholars"); Runkel. supra note 5 (noting that pre-dispute arbitration agreements "have resulted
in extensive controversy"); STONE supra note 8, at 585 (emphasizing that the use of arbitration
has resulted in a number of new challenges brought by employees regarding the enforceability of
arbitration clauses); Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 1017 (noting that the trend of mandatory
arbitration clauses to assert statutory rights effectively acts as a new yellow dog contract of the
1990s).
62. See Green, supra note 61, at 407 ("Due to the meteoric rise of the ADR movement,
increasing distrust of the legal system by corporate leaders, and the Supreme Court's 1991 en-
dorsement of arbitration to resolve statutory employment discrimination disputes in Gilmer, a
growing number of employers have started to use mandatory arbitration agreements."); Runkel,
supra note 5 (noting that employers seek arbitration agreements and not employees and that
employers are increasingly requiring employees to sign an arbitration agreement or be dis-
charged or not hired); STONE, supra note 8, at 585 (noting that Gilmer opened the door for
employers to utilize mandatory arbitration agreements in the non-union sector, referencing a
survey by the Government Accounting Office that found ten percent of private sector employers
were using nonunion arbitration systems). See also AAA Caseload Hits All-Time High, Disp.
RESOL. TIMES, April-June 2002, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15771&JSPsrc=
upload\LIVESITENewsAndEvents\Publications\DRTimes\articles.html (last visited July 8,
2003). The AAA reported a 5.5 percent increase in employment arbitration for the year 2001.
Id. The total case number went from 2,049 in 2000 to 2,159 for 2001. Id.
63. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Notice 915.002 (1997),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited July 8, 2003). The EEOC
concluded:
The use of unilaterally imposed agreements mandating binding arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination disputes as a condition of employment harms both the individual
civil rights claimant and the public interest in eradicating discrimination. Those whom
the law seeks to regulate should not be permitted to exempt themselves from federal
enforcement of civil rights laws. Nor should they be permitted to deprive civil rights
claimants of the choice to vindicate their statutory rights in the courts - an avenue of
redress determined by Congress to be essential to enforcement.
Id. See also Tanya A. Yatsco, How About a Real Answer? Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition
of Employment and the National Labor Relations Board's Stance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 257 (1998)
(exploring the NLRB's opposition to mandatory arbitration agreements).
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and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 64 have issued strong
policy statements against using arbitration to resolve individual em-
ployment disputes. To clarify the underlying issues regarding arbitra-
tion, an understanding of the history and intent behind the
codification of the FAA and relevant cases is necessary.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
1. History of the FAA
Arbitration law was initially governed by state statutes and a
"hodgepodge of English, state, and federal cases" and, thus, lacked
"universal harmony. ' 65 Judicial distaste and refusal to enforce com-
mercial arbitration agreements also impeded the growth of arbitra-
tion. 66 As business began to flourish in the early 1900s, however,
business groups such as the maritime industry lobbied for a reform
movement to overcome these obstacles. 67
The American Bar Association's Committee on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Law drafted proposals for a federal arbitration act in
1921, 1922, and 1923.68 The United States Arbitration Act (USAA)
was unanimously passed by Congress and approved by President Coo-
lidge in 1925.69 The USAA was renamed the FAA 70 and was later
codified in 1947 as Title IX of the United States Code.7t The history
of the FAA indicates that the motivation for adopting the Act was "to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
. . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts. '72 The FAA specifically sought to simplify commer-
cial transactions and provide a less costly, but more efficient, forum
for merchants to resolve their disputes.73
64. See Green, supra note 61, at 435.
65. MAcNEIL, supra note 11, at 21-22 (describing arbitration as "the common law of
Nowhere").
66. 45 A.B.A. Rep. 75 (1920); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 39
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act:
An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 283-84 (1996).
67. MAcNEIL, supra note 11, at 21-22 (discussing in detail the gaps in arbitration law that
resulted in a need for reformation).
68. STONE, supra note 8, at 312.
69. Id. at 313.
70. Id.
71. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (2000).
72. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
73. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126 (2001).
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2. Interpretation of the FAA's Exemption Clause
The main provision of the FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.7 4
However, section 1 of the FAA contains a "curious exclusion" regard-
ing contracts of employment,75 stating, ".... nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce."'76 The interpretation and application of this exemption clause
is the source of most litigation regarding the FAA.77 The main ques-
tion posed when parties litigate FAA disputes is whether the FAA was
meant to apply to a given industry's employment contracts. 78 Two is-
sues necessarily clarify this question, namely: (1) Congress's com-
merce power at the time the FAA was passed; and (2) the language
utilized in the FAA relating to commerce. 79
The FAA includes all contracts "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce" but excludes employment contracts of workers "engaged
in ... commerce. ' 80 The plain meaning of the statute appears to ex-
empt any worker engaged in interstate commerce.8' However, inter-
pretation of this clause has remained in "a muddle because the
interpreters, lacking an appreciation of the historical context, have felt
free to provide a [sic] historical (and in some cases anachronistic) 'ex-
planation' in support of their conclusions."8 2 Three separate interpre-
tations of the clause have been adopted by circuit courts.8 3 Under the
first interpretation, some courts read the statute as exempting all em-
74. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
75. Feliu, supra note 33, at 10.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
77. Feliu, supra note 33, at 10.
78. See generally Feliu, supra note 33, at 9-13.
79. Id. at 10-12 (discussing the three interpretations of the FAA exemption clause); Finkin,
supra note 66, at 282.
80. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
81. Finkin, supra note 66, at 289.
82. Id. at 289-90 (discussing in detail the legislative history and floor debates regarding the
FAA, with particular focus on the history of the exemption clause that supports the broad con-
struction of the clause).
83. Feliu, supra note 33, at 10-12; see also Finkin, supra note 66, at 289-98.
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ployment agreements. 84 Courts following the second interpretation
read the statute as exempting only employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. 85 Finally, other courts have interpreted the
statute as exempting only those classes of workers engaged in trans-
porting goods and services in foreign and interstate commerce. 86
a. Exemption Clause Applies To All Employment Contracts
The broadest interpretation is that the exemption clause applies to
all employment contracts.87 Proponents of this view argue that the
legislative history and Congress's commerce power at the time the
FAA was enacted support the interpretation that the FAA was only
intended to apply to commercial transactions.88 As mentioned, the
proposal of the FAA originated with the business community's desire
to establish an alternative to resolving commercial disputes.8 9 The
legislative history and floor debates also indicate that there was some
opposition from the International Seamen's Union (ISU) regarding
the proposed arbitration act. 90 The ISU argued that the FAA would
compel arbitration of employment matters and, in particular, wage is-
sues between seamen and their employers. 91 In response, the chair-
man of the ABA committee responsible for the proposed arbitration
act stated that the bill "is not intended [to] be an act referring labor
84. See supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("neither the
phrase 'maritime transaction' nor the phrase 'contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce' was intended to encompass employment contracts"); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of
Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("when Congress passed legislation to
enable arbitration agreements to be enforced by federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy
with respect to labor contracts"); Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that proper construction and legislative history indicate that the FAA did not apply to
employment contracts and thus did not apply to the collective bargaining agreement covering
the plaintiff's employment); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the contracts of employment were outside of the scope of the FAA, but that a
securities agreement to arbitrate was not an employment contract and thus not exempt); Arce v.
Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (finding an enforceable
arbitration clause but that employment contracts were exempted, specifically disagreeing with
the Third Circuit's decision in Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. Electrical Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1954)).
88. Feliu, supra note 33, at 10-11; Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing highlights of legislative history and floor debates: "neither the history of the drafting of the
original bill by the ABA, nor the records of deliberations in Congress during the years preceding
the ultimate enactment in 1925, contains any evidence that the proponents of the legislation
intended it to apply to agreements affecting employment"); Finkin, supra note 66, at 282-89.
89. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
90. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126-27.
91. Id.
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disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their
damages are, if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in this."
'92
Moreover, the chairman advised including language in the act to clar-
ify this point, stating "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen or any class of workers in interstate
and foreign commerce." 93 Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Com-
merce, also promoted the inclusion of this language to avoid
confusion. 94
Proponents of this broad interpretation of the exemption clause
also argue that the words "any other class of workers engaged in com-
merce" indicate that the exemption should apply to all contracts of
employment. 95 Critics of this view, however, point out that reading
sections 1 and 2 of the FAA together indicates that Congress makes a
distinction between "a transaction involving commerce" and exempt-
ing those workers "engaged... in commerce. ' 96 Congress would have
used the same terms if the sections were meant to be read the same
way and, consequently, critics argue that the clause must exempt only
those workers actually engaged in the transportation of goods in inter-
state or foreign commerce. 97
On the other hand, proponents of the broad interpretation argue
that Congress's commerce powers were limited when the FAA was
passed; thus, Congress had the power to regulate those workers "en-
gaged" in commerce but had no power to regulate employment rela-
tions who "affected" commerce. 98  Under this argument, the
exemption clause was meant to cover all employment contracts af-
fected by Congress's commerce power at the time the FAA was
enacted. 99
92. Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923).
93. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126-27.
94. Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 14 (1923).
95. Feliu, supra note 33, at 11; Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir.
1991); Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117, 120-21 (1995).
96. Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1954) (emphasis
added); see also Finkin, supra note 66, at 293-95.
97. Finkin, supra note 66, at 293-95.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id.
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b. Exemption Clause Applies to Union Employees
The second interpretation of the exemption clause is that it only
applies to workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 100
At the time the FAA was introduced, Congress had already enacted
special arbitration legislation for seamen and railroad unions and thus
exempted these groups from the FAA.1o1 Under this view, courts rea-
soned that Congress did not intend to disrupt procedures connected
with unions and therefore the phrase "contracts of employment" was
interpreted as meaning collective bargaining agreements. 10 2 Most
courts, however, have abandoned the view that the exemption clause
only applies to employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. 0 3
c. Exemption Clause Applies to Workers Engaged in Commerce
The final interpretation is that the exemption clause applies to indi-
vidual employment contracts except those for workers actually en-
gaged in the physical movement of goods in interstate or foreign
commerce. 10 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in Tenney Engineering v. United Electrical Workers'0 5 first ex-
pressed this narrow reading of the exemption clause.
In Tenney Engineering, the court concluded that seamen and rail-
road employees shared two qualities: first, both classes of employees
were directly engaged in the movement of goods in interstate or for-
eign commerce, and; second, both classes of employees already had
special procedures established to resolve their employment dis-
putes.10 6 Interpreting section 1 of the FAA, the court applied ejusdem
generis, the canon of construction that holds "when a general word or
phrase follows an enumeration of specific persons or things, the gen-
eral word or phrase will be construed as applying only to those per-
100. Lincoln Mills of Ala. v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81, 86 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees
v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951); Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil
Workers, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951); Shirley-Herman Co. v. Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806,
809 (2d Cir. 1950).
101. Feliu, supra note 33, at 11; Finkin, supra note 66, at 290-92.
102. Feliu, supra note 33, at 11.
103. Id.
104. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communica-
tions, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-49 (5th Cir. 1996); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local
Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468
F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d
Cir. 1954).
105. 207 F.2d at 452-53.
106. Id.
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sons or things of the class within which the specific types fall."'1 7 The
court therefore interpreted "any other class of worker" as being those
similarly situated as seamen or railroad employees, or those actually
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce. 10 8 Crit-
ics of this view argue that this reasoning is flawed because other trans-
portation workers engaged in interstate commerce were highly visible
at the time and thus would have been included in this exemption
clause. 0 9
The Tenney Engineering court also supported its holding by inter-
preting "engaged in ... commerce" as "affecting commerce."' 1 0 Crit-
ics of this approach stress that exempting only some employees
produces an anomaly in that "a boilerplate arbitration clause in an
interstate trucker's employment form or application could not be cov-
ered ... but the same provision in the same form used for the employ-
ment of the trucking company's secretary would be."11' Moreover,
this interpretation of the exemption clause is the result of a sweeping
judicial policy in favor of arbitration rather than clear legislative
intent. 112
In Circuit City v. Adams, in a 5-4 split, the United States Supreme
Court held that section 1 of the FAA only exempts transportation
workers and thus applies to all other employment contracts.11 3 The
Court specifically rejected the argument that "engaged in . . . com-
merce" should be interpreted based on Congress's commerce power
when the FAA was adopted in 1925.114 The Court also reasoned that
interpreting "transaction involving commerce" as applying to only
commercial contracts would render the exemption clause
meaningless.' 1
5
C. The Road Leading to EEOC v. Luce
The United States Supreme Court has "grappled" with issues relat-
ing to the FAA for fifty years 1 6 as the enforceability of arbitration
agreements has bred litigation in various contexts.' t 7 Early cases deal-
107. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 218 (Pocket ed. 1996).
108. Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 452-53.
109. Finkin, supra note 66, at 291-92.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 298.
112. Id. at 298-99.
113. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105. 109 (2001).
114. Id. at 118-19.
115. Id. at 113-15.
116. STONE, supra note 8, at 379.
117. See generally Runkel, supra note 5. The United States Supreme Court has enforced
agreements to arbitrate under a variety of federal statutes: Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama
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ing with the enforceability of arbitration provisions illustrate the
Court's initial disapproval for compelling arbitration of statutory or
tort law claims. 118 The Court reversed its position in the 1980s and
adopted a federal policy favoring arbitration. 119 The most noticeable
impact of this change is in the area of employment law and an em-
ployee's ability to litigate statutory employment discrimination
claims. 20
1. Wilko v. Swan 121
Wilko v. Swan was one of the Supreme Court's first opportunities to
interpret the scope of the FAA.12 2 Wilko applied the FAA to a claim
arising out of an agreement to arbitrate under the Securities Exchange
Act. 23 In holding that the arbitration clause was void, the Court ex-
pressed concerns including the one-sidedness of an arbitrator and the
arbitrator's ability to misinterpret or forgo the law. 124 The Court was
particularly concerned that an arbitrator's decision could be rendered
without reasoning and without a complete record of the
proceedings. 125
2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 26
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether a union's agreement to arbitrate waived the rights
of an individual to litigate statutory claims. 27 Pursuant to the provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement, the petitioner-employee in-
itiated a grievance procedure, against the respondent-employer,
alleging that he was fired on the basis of race and without just
cause.'2 8 After losing in arbitration, the employee filed a Title VII
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (the Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953)) (the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 226
(1987) (the Securities Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)); and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(Sherman Antitrust Act).
118. STONE. supra note 8, at 379.
119. Id.
120. Feliu, supra note 33, at 10.
121. Id.
122. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 435-36; see also MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 63-64.
125. See supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
128. Id. at 39.
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lawsuit against the employer. 129 The employer argued that the peti-
tioner's right to sue was barred because the issue had already been
arbitrated. 130 The Court held that the employee was not precluded
from bringing a Title VII suit because the union only represented the
employee's contractual claims. 13 1
The Court reasoned that strong congressional intent conferred on
federal courts "plenary powers to secure compliance with Title VII"
and that "deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with this
goal.' 32 Moreover, the Court recognized that "the choice of forums
inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindi-
cated. ' 133 The Court concluded that arbitration was inappropriate for
"the final resolution of rights created under Title VII" and expressed
concern regarding the ability of an arbitrator to deal with statutory
interpretation as opposed to contractual disputes.134 In summary, the
Court stated:
[T]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary
responsibility of the courts, and judicial construction has proved es-
pecially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language
frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law
concepts.... Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral procedure that
enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however,
makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of
Title VII issues than the federal courts. 135
Although the Court has departed from Gardner-Denver's reasoning,
this case has not yet been overruled.
3. Southland Corp. v. Keating 136
A shift in the Supreme Court's position regarding arbitration
emerged in Southland Corp. v. Keating.137 A year prior to Southland
Corp., in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,1 38 the Court announced that questions regarding arbitrability
129. Id. at 42-43.
130. Id. at 43.
131. Id. at 49-51.
132. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56.
133. Id. at 56 (citing U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1971)).
134. Id. at 56.
135. Id. at 57-58 (the Court notes the following differences make arbitration an inappropriate
forum: the fact-finding of arbitration is not compatible to judicial fact-finding; the arbitration
records of the proceeding are not complete; the rules and procedures common to civil trials do
not apply; and the arbitrator has no obligation to submit a written decision).
136. Id.
137. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
138. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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"must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration."139
In Southland Corp., the Court reaffirmed this new policy and found
a provision of the Californian Franchise Investment Act, requiring ju-
dicial review of claims brought under it, was preempted by the FAA
when a contract included an arbitration clause. 140 The Court reasoned
that section 2 of the FAA, as substantive law under the Commerce
Clause, extended to both federal and state courts, and "Congress in-
tended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements."'141 The Court's new policy that the
FAA preempts any state law that is "hostile to arbitration"' 42 repre-
sents the turning point for the Court's interpretation of all arbitration
agreements.
4. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co. 143
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Co.,144 a seminal and much criticized case that captured the
Court's clear reversal of its position regarding arbitration in the em-
ployment context.145
Interstate hired Robert Gilmer as a Manager of Financial Services
in May 1981.146 Gilmer registered as a securities representative with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as a requirement of his em-
ployment.147 Gilmer's registration contract with the NYSE included
an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising between him and Inter-
state. 148 At age sixty-two, Gilmer was fired in May 1987 by Inter-
state. 149 Gilmer filed a claim against Interstate pursuant to the
ADEA.1 0 In response, Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitra-
139. Id. at 24.
140. 465 U.S. at 16.
141. Id.
142. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001).
143. Id.
144. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
145. See generally Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's
Impact and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employ-
ment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1
(1996); Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost - How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1994); Sternlight,
supra note 37; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1.
146. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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tion pursuant to Gilmer's contract. 151 Relying on Gardner-Denver,
the district court denied Interstate's motion.152 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding no congres-
sional intent to preclude arbitrating ADEA claims.153
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision.' 54 The Court reasoned that individual agreements to
arbitrate are considered enforceable unless the plaintiff can show that
Congress intended otherwise through the statute's text, legislative his-
tory, or through an inherent conflict between arbitration and the pur-
pose of the statute. 155 The Court found that Gilmer did not meet this
burden of proof and held that the ADEA claim was arbitrable. 156 In
reaching this holding, the Court disagreed with Gilmer's following ar-
guments: that compulsory arbitration conflicted with the social poli-
cies furthered by the ADEA; that arbitration would "undermine the
role of the EEOC in enforcing ADEA;" that arbitrating ADEA
claims would deprive the claimants of the procedural advantages asso-
ciated with federal courts; that arbitrators were biased; and that there
was unequal bargaining power between an employee and an em-
ployer. 157 Additionally, the Court found that an arbitrator's failure to
issue a written opinion was not problematic and rejected Gilmer's
claims that no written opinion would deprive the public of notice re-
garding employer abuses, deter the development of law, or preclude
appellate review. 158
Moreover, the Court found that Gilmer's reliance on Gardner-Den-
ver was misplaced because Gardner-Denver involved a different issue
relating to an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.159 Because the agreement to arbitrate in Gardner-Denver was
incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement, the Court in Gil-
mer stressed the following as distinguishing factors: 1) employees did
not agree to arbitrate statutory claims, only contract claims, via a col-
lective bargaining agreement; 2) the interests of an individual em-
ployee may be subordinated to the collective interests of the union;
and 3) the collective bargaining agreements were not decided under
151. Id.
152. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985); Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1989)).
156. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
157. Id. at 27-33.
158. Id. at 31.
159. Id. at 33-34.
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the FAA, which favors a liberal federal policy toward arbitration. 60
Contrary to the view expressed in Gardner-Denver, the Court rejected
the argument that arbitration was an inferior process for resolving
statutory claims. 161 The Court therefore chose to distinguish Gilmer
instead of overruling Gardner-Denver.62
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, argued that the Court was
mistaken in concluding that an ADEA claim is arbitrable without first
determining whether the FAA applied to employment contracts.
1 63
Justice Stevens reasoned that based on legislative history and intent,
the FAA exempted employment contracts. 164 Moreover, he found
that compulsory arbitration conflicted with the congressional purpose
of the ADEA.165 In particular, Stevens argued that the limited reme-
dies available in an arbitral forum conflict with the courts' ability to
award broad injunctive relief in furtherance of the purposes behind
the ADEA, Title VII, and other federal statutes. 166 Citing Chief Jus-
tice Warren E. Burger, Justice Stevens stressed that deferring to arbi-
tral decisions allows an employer to contract away the rights of an
individual and therefore contradicts with the sole purpose of the Civil
Rights Act. 167 Moreover, he argued that the Court abandoned prece-
dent and "eviscerate[d] the important role played by an independent
judiciary in eradicating employment discrimination ' 168 and "'has ef-
fectively rewritten the [FAA]."169
Because Gilmer never answered the question as to whether employ-
ment contracts are exempt from the FAA, the lower courts remained
unsure of how to interpret the FAA exemption or the scope of the
FAA in terms of the employment context. 170 Meanwhile, in response
to the Gilmer decision, employers increased the use of mandatory ar-
bitration agreements as a condition of employment for non-union em-
ployees.17' Although courts initially upheld these agreements, by the
1990s, courts, government agencies, and others began to reevaluate
160. Id. at 34-35; see also MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 76-77; Malin, supra note 23, at 84.
161. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
162. See Malin, supra note 23, at 83.
163. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 36-41.
165. Id. at 42.
166. Id. at 41-42.
167. Id. at 42 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.. 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981)).
168. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42-43.
169. Id.
170. STONE, supra note 8, at 570.
171. Susan T. MacKenzie 6 Pearl Zucnlewski. Arbitrarion and Empiovment Disputes. in AR-
BITRATION Now: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND INVIGORATION 39
(Paul H. Haagen ed.. 1999).
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these agreements based on their "unanticipated undesirable
effects."t 72
5. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai 173
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai was one of the first cases
to undermine the Gilmer doctrine. 174 In this case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "a Title VII plaintiff
may only be forced to forego her statutory remedies and arbitrate her
claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitra-
tion. 175 Applying this "knowing and voluntary" standard to the facts
of the case, the Lai court held that the employee did not knowingly
agree to arbitrate because the agreement signed by the employee did
not specify the disputes subject to arbitration. 176 Although other
courts adopted the knowing and voluntary requirement, 177 most now
reject this standard. 178
172. Id.
173. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1995).
174. Mackenzie & Zuchlewski, supra note 171, at 39.
175. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
176. Id.
177. See Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming
the district court's denial of the employer's motion to compel arbitration because the terms of
the arbitration agreement were deficient in purporting to cover statutory claims); Farrand v.
Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993) (because the arbitration agreement did not author-
ize arbitration of employment disputes, the parties could not have agreed to arbitrate the em-
ployee's ADEA claim); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998)
(employee did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to file her claims in court
because the employer did not provide a copy of the rules before she agreed to the employment
contract); Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (an individual
may waive his or her right to pursue Title VII claims in federal court, but the waiver must be
knowing; no evidence that employee waived this right when she signed the employment hand-
book); Phox v. Allied Capital Advisers, No. CIV.A.96-2745, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5709, at *1
(D.D.C. Apr. 11, 1997) (denying motion to compel arbitration because when the employee
signed the employment handbook, he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to arbitrate his
statutory claims); Hoffman v. Aaron Kamhi, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying
motion to compel arbitration because the contract was ambiguously phrased and failed to make
specific reference to discrimination claims and because the plaintiff could not have intended to
waive his rights under laws not yet in existence).
178. Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 231 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the knowing
standard established in Lai, ignorance of terms is no excuse and agreement to arbitrate will be
enforced absent a showing of fraud, duress, mistake, or some other ground upon which a con-
tract may be voided); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (although the
Securities Code did not explicitly provide for the arbitration of employment disputes, the court
reasoned that the Code encompassed such disputes, and thus the employee had agreed to submit
her Title VII and ADEA claims to arbitration); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832
(8th Cir. 1997) (even though the employment handbook stated it was not meant to be a contract
or binding, the court found the arbitration clause constituted an enforceable contract because it
was separate from the other provisions of the handbook); Beauchamp v. Great W. Life Assur-
ance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (rejecting the Lai knowing standard and holding
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Other courts have held mandatory arbitration agreements invalid in
the employment context based on grounds of unconscionability. t79
Some courts have remained sensitive to the unequal bargaining power
between employer and employee.'i 0 Courts have also have found bias
in some arbitration agreements.' 8 '
6. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.' 8 2
Finally, other courts have held compulsory arbitration as a condi-
tion of employment undermines statutory rights.18 3 In Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the employer could not, as a condition of em-
ployment, compel individuals to waive their Title VII rights to a judi-
cial forum.8 4 The court utilized the Gilmer test and found that the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as supported by legislative
history, was to strengthen employees' protections and remedies in dis-
crimination claims.'8 5 As a result, the court reasoned that employers
could not use mandatory arbitration agreements to undermine these
rights. 186 The court concluded that Congress incorporated a list of al-
ternative dispute resolutions in section 118 of the Civil Rights Act to
that a party has knowledge of the existence and scope of an arbitration clause if the party has
signed the document incorporating the clause and in absence of fraud, deception, or other mis-
conduct that would excuse the lack of such knowledge); DeCaminada v. Coopers & Lybrand,
LLP, 591 N.W.2d 364 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (the FAA did not require "knowledge," and an
otherwise valid arbitration clause did not depend on whether a party was specifically aware of its
scope).
179. Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (on remand, the court found that the
arbitration clause was: 1) procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion,
drafted by a party of superior bargaining power; and 2) substantively unconscionable because it
bound the employee to arbitrate but not the employer, limited the relief available to the employ-
ees, and forced the employee to arbitrate his statutory claims); Hooters of Am., v. Phillips, 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding an employer breached the agreement to arbitrate by establish-
ing unfair arbitration rules, the court specifically found that the notice and procedural rules were
one-sided, which allowed Hooters to select a panel of biased arbitrators); Gibson v. Neighbor-
hood Health Clinics, 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to compel arbitration because the
agreement bound the employee to arbitrate claims but not the employer); Stirlen v. Supercuts,
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Ct. App. 1997) (finding the arbitration clause provides the employer with
more rights and remedies than would otherwise be available while depriving the employees of
rights and remedies they would normally enjoy).
180. Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 892; Hooters of Am., 173 F.3d at 935.
181. See supra note 180; Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 995 F. Supp 190 (D. Mass. 1998), affd,
170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (district court found that the arbitration system of the NYSE was
biased because the NYSE members controlled the system).
182. See generally Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1185.
185. Id. at 1190-93.
186. Id. at 1199.
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provide the employee with more options to bring Title VII claims. 87
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Duffield, the Ninth
Circuit overruled Duffield in Luce.a88
Even though the Supreme Court has held that the FAA applies to
employment contracts, a89 one of the main questions unanswered by
Circuit City was whether an employer could require an employee to
sign a mandatory arbitration agreement as a condition of employ-
ment. This issue was presented in Luce.190
D. The Ninth Circuit and EEOC v. Luce
1. Background
In September of 1997, the law firm Luce, Forward, Hamilton and
Scripps (Luce) had an opening for a full-time legal-secretary. 191 Don-
ald Lagatree applied and was offered the job. 192 After reporting for
work on September 16, 1997, Lagatree received a letter of employ-
ment confirming the job offer and detailing other terms and condi-
tions of employment such as salary and benefits. 193 A binding
arbitration clause was included in this letter. 194 The clause required
Lagatree to waive his right to judicial resolution of any "claims arising
from or related to [his] employment or termination of ... employ-
ment. 1 95 On September 18, 1997, Lagatree advised Luce that he
could not sign the letter because the arbitration clause was "unfair."'1 96
Lagatree was particularly concerned about maintaining his civil liber-
ties, including the right to have access to a jury trial in an at-will em-
ployment situation. 197 Luce refused to strike the clause and advised
Lagatree that the arbitration clause "was a non-negotiable condition
of employment."1 98 Lagatree refused to sign, and Luce subsequently
terminated Lagatree's "conditional employment.' 99
187. Id. at 1194-99.
188. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2002).
189. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (except transportation workers).
190. 303 F.3d at 997.
191. First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 5, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
192. Id.
193. Id.; Luce, 303 F.3d at 997.
194. First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 5, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Luce, 303 F.3d at 997-98.
198. Id. at 998.
199. First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 5, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
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In February 1998, Lagatree sued Luce in Los Angeles Superior
Court for wrongful termination.200 Luce's motion to dismiss was
granted, and the Superior Court held that Luce did not unlawfully
discharge Lagatree based on Lagatree's refusal to sign an arbitration
clause as a condition of employment. 20 1 The Superior Court's deci-
sion was affirmed by a California appellate court, and the California
Supreme Court denied review.202
2. The EEOC Claim
On March 4, 1998, two months prior to the Ninth's Circuit decision
in Duffield,20 3 Lagatree filed a complaint with the EEOC, "alleging
that [Luce] fired him in retaliation for [his] opposition to employment
practices [he] believed violated Title VII, the ADEA, the EPA and
the ADA. '20 4 Lagatree argued that his claim was evident because the
firm would not hire him unless he waived his right to challenge any
discrimination claims in court.205
The EEOC sued Luce on behalf of Lagatree and in the public's
interest under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the EPA "to cor-
rect unlawful employment practices on the basis [of] retaliation, and
to provide appropriate relief to [Mr.] Lagatree who was adversely af-
fected by such practices when he was terminated" because of his re-
fusal to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement, "or in the
alternative was not hired in retaliation for his refusing to sign the
mandatory arbitration agreement. ' 206 On behalf of Lagatree, the
EEOC sought relief, including "'rightful place employment,' back
wages and benefits, and compensatory and punitive damages. '20 7 The
EEOC also sought a permanent injunction to enjoin Luce from engag-
200. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
201. Id.
202. Id.; Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Ct. App. 1989),
review denied, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 262 (Cal. 2000). This procedural history is relevant because the
state court decisions illustrate the division between courts regarding arbitration clauses in the
employment context. At that time, the Ninth Circuit had not yet ruled this way, and, in fact,
Duffield was decided a few months later, in May 1998.
203. First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 8, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC) (also noting that regardless of the holding in Duf-
field, Luce continued to require employees to agree to arbitration as a condition of
employment).
204. Id.
205. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
206. First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 8, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
207. Id. at 9: Luce. 303 F.3d at 998.
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ing in unlawful retaliation and an order to stop Luce from utilizing
mandatory arbitration agreements. 20 8
3. District Court Relies on Duffield
The district court granted partial summary judgment for both Luce
and the EEOC.20 9 The court found Lagatree was precluded from any
monetary award because of his prior litigation against Luce in state
court.210 Relying on Duffield, however, the court issued an injunction
enjoining Luce from "requiring its employees to agree to arbitrate
their Title VII claims as a condition of employment and from attempt-
ing to enforce any such previously executed agreements. ' 21 1 An in-
junction was not issued prohibiting arbitration of ADA, ADEA, or
EPA claims.212 In addition, the court did not expressly rule on the
EEOC's retaliation claim or address the theory of liability.21 3 Luce
appealed the district court's decision regarding the injunction, and the
EEOC cross-appealed, seeking an injunction to enjoin Luce from en-
gaging in its retaliation practice.214
4. Ninth Circuit Overrules Duffield
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed
Luce en banc and held that Luce's refusal to hire Lagatree was not
unlawful retaliation because "Lagatree's right to a judicial forum is
not afforded absolute protection under any federal statute. '215 Addi-
tionally, reasoning that the Supreme Court "implicitly overruled Duf-
field" in Circuit City, the Luce court held that "employers may require
employees to sign agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condi-
tion of their employment. '216
208. First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 8-9, EEOC v. Luce, 303
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC); Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
209. EEOC v. Luce, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
210. Id. at 1086; see also First Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 9,
EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
211. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
212. Id.
213. Id.; Response to Petition for Initial Rehearing En Bane for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at
2, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC). The district court's
failure to address the claims presented by the EEOC is important because, by relying on Duf-
field, the court essentially changed the EEOC's argument (the EEOC did not even rely on Duf-
field for its retaliation argument), which would, in turn, open the door to re-evaluation of
Duffield.
214. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
215. Id. at 1008.
216. Id. at 997.
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The Luce court advanced two arguments in support of its hold-
ing.21 7 First, the court relied on the Supreme Court's dicta in Circuit
City that "arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by
federal law." 218 The court reasoned that this language was not consis-
tent "with Duffield's holding that Congress intended Title VII ... to
preclude compulsory arbitration of discrimination claims. '219
The second argument the Luce court advanced was based on the
Supreme Court's reiteration in Circuit City that "by agreeing to arbi-
trate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbi-
tral, rather than a judicial forum. '220 The Ninth Circuit also found it
persuasive that other circuits, as well as the Supreme Courts of Cali-
fornia and Nevada, disagreed with the Duffield decision.221
Addressing the retaliation claim,222 the Luce court found that "as a
matter of law Luce Forward's refusal to hire Lagatree for not signing a
compulsory arbitration agreement was not illegal retaliation. '223 The
court reasoned that Lagatree "could not have reasonably believed
that Luce Forward's policy of requiring arbitration was an unlawful
employment practice, his opposition was not protected opposition
conduct. '224 Moreover, the court rejected the EEOC's argument that
Luce could not fire Lagatree in retaliation for reserving his right to
bring a civil action, reasoning that Lagatree's right to a judicial forum
is not "afforded absolute protection under each of the federal anti-
retaliation provisions. ' 225
217. Id. at 1002-04.
218. Id. at 1002 (citing Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122-23 (2001)).
219. Id. at 1003.
220. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1002 (citing Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23).
221. Id. at 1002.
222. Id. at 1005-07. Employment discrimination laws make it unlawful for employers to retali-
ate against an employee or applicant because he or she has engaged in a protected activity. Id.
at 1004. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d); EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The Luce court summarized what must be proved to es-
tablish retaliation: 1) the employee or applicant "engaged in a protected activity"; 2) the em-
ployee or applicant "suffered an adverse employment decision"; and 3) "there was a causal link
between [the employee or applicant's] activity and the adverse employment decision." Id. at
1005. "Protected activities include: 1) opposing an unlawful employment practice; and 2) partici-
pating in a statutorily authorized proceeding." Id. See also Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,
679 (9th Cir. 1997); Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978).
223. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1007.
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The dissent in Luce criticized the majority's reliance on Circuit City
in overruling Duffield, arguing that Duffield and Circuit City are the
"proverbial apples and oranges: different law, different issues, and dif-
ferent, yet compatible holdings."226 The dissent pointed out that in
utilizing the test established by the Supreme Court in Gilmer, the Duf-
field court's holding was determined only after careful scrutiny of the
text of Title VII and the legislative history of that section. 227 Duffield.
according to the dissent, should remain good law and was in no way
overruled by Circuit City.2 2 8 Addressing the second argument made
by the majority, the dissent argued that Duffield did not establish that
arbitration was a substantive right but a procedural right. 229
III. EEOC v. LucE: ANOTHER PRODUCT OF
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
The foregoing analysis will demonstrate that Luce was wrongly de-
cided. First, this section will argue that the district court misconstrued
the issues presented by the EEOC and thus incorrectly relied on Duf-
field.230 As a result, the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to overrule
Duffield.231 This section, however, will demonstrate that Duffield
should remain good law in light of the legislative purpose behind the
Civil Rights Act. Similar to the dissent's argument in Luce, this sec-
tion will argue that the majority's application of Gilmer was mislead-
ing and, in overruling Duffield, the majority misapplied Circuit City. 232
In turn, this misapplication resulted in the failure of the EEOC's retal-
iation claim.233 This section will conclude that Luce can only be rec-
226. Id. at 1008.
227. Id. at 1010-12.
228. Id. at 1012-13.
Nowhere in Duffield, however, did we suggest that this "right to a judicial forum" is a
substantive right, as the majority claims. Indeed, our statement in Duffield that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 "increased substantially the procedural rights and remedies
available to Title VII plaintiffs" suggests, to the contrary, that we perceived the right to
jury trial as a procedural right. Duffield, then, "was not premised ... on the arbitral
forum causing a loss of substantive rights." Instead, "Duffield found ... that Congress
intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims." Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court's statement that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute," does not contradict our con-
clusion that "Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims."
Luce, 303 F.3d at 1012-13.
229. Id. at 1009.
230. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
232. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1008, 1010.
233. Id. at 996.
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onciled as another example of judicial law-making that is based on
judicial "advocacy, not history. '2 34
A. Overlooking the Retaliation Claim
Instead of explicitly addressing the retaliation claim presented by
the EEOC,235 the district court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Duffield "required [the district court] to issue an injunction
prohibiting [Luce] from requiring its employees to agree to arbitration
of their Title VII claims as a condition of employment and from at-
tempting to enforce any such previously executed agreements. '236
The district court avoided the statutory anti-retaliation claims by ren-
dering a decision based solely on Duffield.237
On appeal, Luce sought to have the case heard en banc in order to
overturn Duffield.238 As the EEOC argued, however, the district
court's decision should not have been reviewed en banc because reso-
lution of the retaliation claim was not dependent on overruling Duf-
field.239 Lagatree was fired because he refused to waive his statutory
234. MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 170. The author noted that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), upholding arbitration under a
state franchise law, is an example of the Court's analysis in regard to arbitration agreements and
was based on "judicial legal 'history':
The majority used artifacts of the history of the [FAA] in building their arguments just
as a mason uses stone in building a stone wall - picking ones that are useful, ignoring
ones that are not, discarding troublesome ones, chipping away offensive spurs on other-
wise useful pieces, twisting and turning each stone until it best fits, and above all, cover-
ing up the chinks and defects with a mortar of words .... The result is a pathological
history.
Id.
235. Response of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee to Petition for Initial Re-
hearing En Banc for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 1-2, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC). The EEOC's introduction is clear:
In this suit, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") claims that
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP ("LFHS"), violated the federal statutory
prohibitions against retaliation by dismissing Donald Lagatree because he refused to
sign an arbitration agreement waiving his right to participate fully in the remedial
mechanisms provided in the federal non-discrimination laws. The EEOC also claims
that LFHS violated these anti-retaliation provisions by maintaining a policy of refusing
to employ any individual who opposes the compulsory waiver of his statutory rights to
seek judicial redress for unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 1.
236. Luce, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
237. See also Response to Petition for Initial Rehearing En Banc for Appellee/Cross-Appel-
lant at 2, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
238. Third Brief on Cross-Appeal for Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 1, EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
239. Response to Petition for Initial Rehearing En Banc for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 2-3,
EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC); see also Luce, 303 F.3d at
1004 (the Ninth Circuit gives some credence to the EEOC's claim but in an indiscreet way: "the
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rights by not signing the arbitration agreement. 240 Unlike Lagatree,
Tonyja Duffield had already agreed to arbitrate her claims. 241 The
issue presented in Luce, based on its particular facts, was therefore
entirely different than the issue presented and resolved in Duffield.242
As a result, the EEOC's complaint did not invoke the FAA (or rely
on Duffield) but rather, alleged that Lagatree's termination was un-
lawful under the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII, ADEA,
ADA, and EPA and not the FAA or the Civil Rights Act. 243 The
EEOC supported this factual difference by pointing out that the FAA,
by its terms, requires the agreement to arbitrate to be 244 "a written
provision ... in a contract ... an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration. 245
B. The Ninth Circuit Seizes the Moment
The Ninth Circuit seized the opportunity to overrule Duffield.246
Ironically, the Luce court first accused the Duffield court of "picking
and choosing snippets of legislative history consistent with its desired
result. '247 The Luce court, however, failed to provide any counter-
evidence regarding legislative intent but concluded that Duffield was
"arguably... at odds with existing Circuit authority. ' 248 Additionally,
the Luce majority supported this argument by listing "Sister Circuit"
decisions that have "unanimously repudiated" Duffield's holding.249
EEOC, nevertheless, does not place all its eggs in Duffield's basket. In fact, the EEOC primarily
argues that Luce Forward unlawfully retaliated against Lagatree by not hiring him after he re-
fused to sign Luce Forward's compulsory arbitration agreement.").
240. Response to Petition for Initial Rehearing En Banc for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 9,
EEOC v. Luce, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC); see also Luce, 303 F.3d at
998.
241. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1186.
242. See also Response to Petition for Initial Rehearing En Banc for Appellee/Cross-Appel-
lant at 3, EEOC v. Luce. 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. CV-00-01322-FMC).
243. Id. at 7-8.
244. Id. at 13.
245. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
246. Luce, 303 F.3d at 997.
247. Id. at 1001.
248. Id. at 1001-02. The court cited only two cases for support, however. The first was Mago
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992). As the court even acknowledged,
Mago did not interpret the legislative history behind section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(provides for arbitration). Luce, 303 F.3d at 1001. Regarding the second case, Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Lai, the court found that section 118 allowed for arbitration "where the
parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods." 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir.
1994).
249. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1002. As the dissent noted, six of the cases listed were prior to the
decision in Duffleld. Id. at 1014 n.5 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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Applying the Gilmer test,250 however, the legislative text and his-
tory of the 1991 Civil Rights Act indicates that Congress did not in-
tend to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for statutory
remedies. 25'
1. Interpretation of Section 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991 "to strengthen and im-
prove Federal civil rights laws. ' 252 As summarized in Duffield, the
amendment has two primary goals:
(1) to 'restore ... civil rights laws' by 'overruling' a series of 1989
Supreme Court decisions that Congress thought represented an un-
duly narrow and restrictive reading of Title VII, and (2) to
'strengthen' Title VII by making it easier to bring and to prove law-
suits, and by increasing the available judicial remedies so that plain-
tiffs could be fully compensated for injuries resulting from
discrimination. Among other things, the 1991 Act provided for the
first time a right to damages and to trial by jury and expanded Title
VII's fee-shifting provisions. 253
One of the changes to the Act included the endorsement2 54 of ADR
for resolution of discrimination claims.2 55 Section 118 embodies Con-
gress's support for ADR: "Where appropriate and to the extent au-
thorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
fact-finding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve dis-
putes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by
this title. '256
250. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
251. See generally Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the
Civil Rights Act as it relates to mandatory arbitration, see Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling Arbi-
tration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1886: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47
KAN. L. REV. 273, 330-31 (1999).
252. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
253. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191.
254. Id. ("Congress also included what Chief Judge Richard Posner has termed 'a polite bow
to the popularity of alternative dispute resolution."' (quoting Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109
F.3d 354, 263 (7th Cir. 1997))).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
256. Id. See generally Sternlight, supra note 251, at 306-07; Grodin, supra note 145, at 30-35.
Professor Grodin explains that the language of the 1991 amendment was derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, which in turn, was derived from section 513 of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA). Id. at 30-31. The committee report associated with the ADA stated that an
agreement to arbitrate did not preclude the right to seek relief under the enforcement provisions
of the Act. Id. at 31. Moreover, the committee indicated that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974) was correct and that section
513 should not preclude the rights and remedies otherwise available to an employee with disabil-
ities. Id. at 31.
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a. Statutory Interpretation of Section 118
Courts have remained divided regarding the interpretation of sec-
tion 118.257 The main source of this divisiveness is the struggle to rec-
oncile the ambiguity of the language "'where appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law"' with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer.258 Although section 118 was drafted before Gil-
mer, the revised Civil Rights Act was not adopted until after Gilmer
was decided.259 As a result of this sequence of events, the inference
was made that either section 118 codified the Gilmer decision or rep-
resented "positive" congressional support for mandatory arbitration
of Title VII claims.260
As the court in Duffield explained, however, both the text and the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend for an em-
ployee to waive his or her right to a judicial forum.261 First, "'where
appropriate"' and to the "'extent authorized by law"' are both limit-
ing phrases and should not be read as conclusive that Congress "was
boundlessly in favor of all forms of arbitration. ' 262 Reading section
118 in the context of the Civil Rights Act's purpose of expanding em-
ployees rights and remedies, the Duffield court reasoned that the in-
tent of "where appropriate" was to provide employees with an
"opportunity to present their claims in an alternative forum." 263
Moreover, this language was meant to encourage voluntary agree-
ments to seek alternative forms of dispute resolution such as
arbitration. 264
The Duffield court also interpreted the phrase "to the extent au-
thorized by law" as not rendering "a fixed definition. '265 At the time
section 118 was drafted, the Duffield court concluded that compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims was unenforceable and thus not author-
ized by law.266 The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Gardner-Denver to support this reasoning and concluded that Con-
gress, when drafting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, could not have pre-
dicted that the Court would narrow Gardner-Denver in Gilmer.267
257. See Sternlight, supra note 251, at 307-08.
258. Id.; see also Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1188-99.
259. Sternlight, supra note 251, at 307-08.
260. Id.; see also Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194-95.
261. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199.
262. Id. at 1193.
263. Id. at 1194.
264. Id. at 1193.
265. Id. at 1194.
266. Id.
267. Duffield, 114 F.3d at 1194.
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b. Legislative History of Section 118
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act also indicates
that Congress did not intend to "incorporate Gilmer's holding into
Title VII. '26s The House Judiciary Committee Report reads:
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not sup-
plant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the
Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agree-
ment or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Ti-
tle VII. 2 6 9
Moreover, the report indicated that the Committee's view was consis-
tent with the Court's interpretation of Title VII in Gardner-Denver
and was not meant to "preclude rights and remedies that would other-
wise be available. '270
Congress also expressly rejected a Republican proposal that would
have allowed employers to utilize mandatory arbitration agreements
in place of judicial review:
The Republican substitute, however, encourages the use of such
mechanisms 'in place of judicial resolution.' Thus, under the latter
proposal employers could refuse to hire workers unless they signed
a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII complaints.
Such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions hold-
ing that workers have the right to go to court, rather than being
forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important statutory
and constitutional rights, including equal opportunity rights. Amer-
ican workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and
their civil rights.27'
Despite this clear history, many courts relied on Gilmer and the ab-
sence of any express congressional opposition to arbitrating claims
under Title VII.272
C. Misstating Gilmer
The majority in Luce, as the dissent points out, is "misleading" 273 by
reasoning that "the Supreme Court in Gilmer expressly permitted re-
quiring compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims as a condition of em-
268. Id. at 1195.
269. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 41 (1991).
270. Id.
271. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 104; see also Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196.
272. Sternlight, supra note 251, at 307-08.
273. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994. 1010 (9th Cir. 2002) (Preger-
son, J., dissenting).
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ployment. ' '274  The Court, in Gilmer, did not address the issue
regarding mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment but,
rather, reasoned that "[a]lthough all statutory claims may not be ap-
propriate for arbitration, 'having made the bargain to arbitrate, the
party should be held to it.' "275 The Court then placed the burden on
Gilmer to prove Congress "intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
forum for ADEA claims. ' 276 The Luce majority over-generalized the
holding in Gilmer by concluding that that the Supreme Court "ex-
pressly permitted"277 mandatory arbitration.278
D. Misapplication of Circuit City in Overruling Duffield
Even if the district court was correct in initially invoking Duffield to
resolve the EEOC's retaliation claim, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that Circuit City "implicitly overruled" 279 Duffield is unsupported.
The issue presented in Circuit City was entirely different than the is-
sue presented in Duffield.280 In Circuit City, the United States Su-
preme Court resolved the issue left unanswered by Gilmer: "Circuit
City petitioned this Court, noting that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that all employment contracts are excluded from the FAA conflicts
with every other Court of Appeals to have addressed the question
.... We granted certiorari to resolve the issue. '281 The Circuit City
opinion was a lengthy discussion regarding the interpretation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the FAA282 and not regarding whether an employer
could require an employee to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement
as a condition of employment.283 The majority's sweeping conclusion
274. Id. at 1005.
275. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
276. Id.
277. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1005.
278. Id. at 1010 (emphasis added). The dissent stated:
While the arbitration provision at issue in Gilmer was indeed required as a condition of
employment, this was not made an issue by the Supreme Court, which held more gener-
ally that the plaintiff "has not met his burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the
ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act."
Id. at 1010 n.3 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 997.
280. Id. at 1008.
281. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110-11 (2001).
282. Id. at 109-24.
283. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
This case presents the issue of whether employers may require as a mandatory condi-
tion of employment in a certain profession ... that all employees waive their right to
bring Title VII and other statutory and non-statutory claims in court and instead agree
in advance to submit all employment-related disputes to binding arbitration.
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in Luce that Circuit City overruled Duffield28 4 therefore does not fol-
low from Circuit City's holding that the FAA applies to non-transpor-
tation employment contracts. 285 As the dissent pointed out in Luce,
"In answering 'yes' to the first question, Circuit City did not also im-
plicitly answer 'yes' to the second question. '28 6
The Supreme Court, in Circuit City, only addressed the specific is-
sue regarding the lawfulness of arbitrating statutory claims to the ex-
tent of re-quoting the language and reasoning of Gilmer.287 As the
dissent in Luce pointed out, "Circuit City added nothing to the inter-
pretation of the Gilmer/Mitsubishi language. ' 288 The Luce majority,
however, overruled Duffield based on this re-quoting of Gilmer in Cir-
cuit City.28 9 The majority's reliance on this language is problematic
because Duffield already addressed the language and test established
in Gilmer, concluding that mandatory arbitration of statutory claims
was unlawful.2 90 In addition, the Supreme Court denied certiorari of
Duffield29t and made no reference to Duffield in Circuit City, under-
mining the majority's "inevitable conclusion" that Duffield is no
longer good law.292 As the Luce dissent argued, "In the end, the ma-
jority does no more than register its own disagreement with this
court's earlier interpretation of the Gilmer/Mitsubishi language in
Duffield.''293
E. The Fall of the Retaliation Claim
By misstating the Gilmer holding and unraveling Duffield, the Luce
court concluded that Lagatree's retaliation claim failed.294 Title VII's
retaliation claim prohibits an employer from retaliating against an em-
ployee for opposing employer conduct that is unlawful. 295 For Laga-
tree's conduct to be protected under this claim, he had to prove that
his opposition to signing the mandatory arbitration agreement was
based on a reasonable belief that Luce's policy of requiring an em-
284. Luce, 303 F.3d at 997.
285. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
286. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1009.
287. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123 ("by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute..."); see also Luce, 303 F.3d at 1013.
288. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1013.
289. Id. at 1002-03.
290. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187-200; see also Luce, 303 F.3d at 1010-13.
291. Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998).
292. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1013 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 996.
295. Id. at 1005.
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ployee to agree to arbitrate his claims as a condition of employment
was unlawful. 296
The majority concluded that Lagatree "could not have reasonably
believed that Luce Forward's arbitration policy was an unlawful em-
ployment practice" because Gilmer "expressly permitted" mandatory
arbitration.297 As previously mentioned, this conclusion misstates the
holding in Gilmer.298 The majority also made the unsupported conclu-
sion that due to the "voluminous contrary legal precedent," Lagatree
could not have reasonably believed Luce's policy was unlawful. 299
Moreover, the majority argued that "Lagatree could not have rea-
sonably interpreted the text of any relevant federal statute to forbid
compulsory arbitration. ' 30 0 The majority seems to overlook the hold-
ing of Duffield, which, ironically, is the same case the district court
invoked in order to find Luce's mandatory arbitration agreement
unlawful. 301
F. Judicial Preference v. Legislative Intent
The district court's circumvention of the EEOC's retaliation claim,
combined with the Ninth Circuit's failure to provide sound support in
overruling Duffield, the Ninth Circuit's misleading reference to Gil-
mer's holding and misapplication of Circuit City, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasong that Lagatree unreasonably believed that Luce's policy
was unlawful, leaves the impression that Mr. Lagatree's outcome was
a product of judicial preference and not congressional intent. This re-
sult is not uncommon to the world of arbitration, as Professor Mac-
Neil explains:
The story of arbitration in the Supreme Court illustrates the cover-
up function of formalism. One cannot immerse oneself in the arbi-
tration cases without coming to the conclusion that a major force
driving the Court is docket-clearing pure and simple. That is, the
Court is motivated to reduce the cases having to be tried by the
judicial system, particularly the federal judicial system. 30 2
Professor Turner also supports this docket-clearing rationale as the
United States Supreme Court's motive for overruling cases such as
Wilko:
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
299. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006.
300. Id.
301. Luce, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
302. MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 172.
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[tihere was a change in the law .. .[that] was not grounded in the
text of the statute or the expressed intention of those who enacted
the FAA in 1925, but in the Court's changing view on the attractive-
ness and adequacy of arbitration. . . .Facing an increasing federal
caseload, the judiciary has approved the use of alternative dispute
mechanisms, including arbitration, as a means of controlling and re-
ducing employment law disputes and other cases on the court dock-
ets. Docket-clearing decisions are driven by a policy goal to clear
court dockets, and with the same sweep, rid the court of cases con-
sidered less prestigious or worthy.3
0 3
Professor Turner utilizes Gilmer as an illustration of judicial prefer-
ence and the consequences that flow. 30 4 Professor Turner points out
that Gilmer failed to prove that Congress did not intend to preclude
arbitrating ADEA claims because:
That answer, based on a fictive intent, not expressed in statutory
text or legislative history, or considered by the Congress enacting
the ADEA in 1967, is not obviously and indisputably correct. Con-
gress could not have expressed an intent on an issue it had not con-
templated. Given the state of FAA-based arbitration law in 1967,
there was no reason for Congress to consider the arbitrability issue
.... Placing the burden on the plaintiff to show that the ADEA-
enacting Congress intended to preclude arbitration required Gilmer
to find and prove a nonexistence. To rule against him, when he was
unsurprisingly unable to meet that burden, is to give operative ef-
fect to the Court's approach to, and view of, arbitration and not the
congressional intent.30 5
As Professor Turner summarized: "'Gilmer's imaginative elaboration
of legislative purpose' is problematic because it certainly provides
more room for judicial lawmaking and policymaking, than does statu-
tory interpretation tethered to text and legislative history.
'30 6
Recent statistics confirm that in the past thirty years, the number of
federal trials has decreased despite the increase in workload. 30 7 Al-
though a variety of reasons may exist for this decline, many experts
303. Ronald Turner, When the Court Makes Law and Policy (With Special Reference to the
Employment Arbitration Issue), 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 287, 301-02 (2002).
304. Id. at 307-08.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 308.
307. Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 A.B.A. J. 24, 26 (2002). In particular, the
following was found:
The percentage of jury and bench trails in civil cases has declined from 10 percent of
cases resolved in 1970 to 2.2 percent in 2001. The percentage of civil jury trials alone
didn't drop as much, but it didn't have as far to go. Juries resolved 4.3 percent of civil
cases in 1970 and only 1.5 percent - 3.633 cases in raw numbers - in 2001. And the
drop occurred against a backarop of federal court workloads that have risen by 146
percent during the same time period.
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suggest that this is the result of the judicial trend in pushing for private
resolutions through mediation, arbitration and other ADR meth-
ods.308 State courts have also experienced a decline in the number of
cases going to trial.30 9
IV. IMPACT OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION FOR EMPLOYEES,
EMPLOYERS, AND ADR
This section will first argue that requiring an employee or applicant
to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement as a condition of employ-
ment is unfair because of the involuntary nature of the agreement.
The actual process of arbitrating a dispute also involves factors weigh-
ing against the employee or applicant. For instance, the neutrality of
the arbitrator and his or her role as a decision-maker in place of judge
and jury is problematic. Arbitration also deprives the employee or
applicant of a public forum in which to air his or her grievances,
presents due process and procedural issues, and involves both limited
remedies and expensive fee sharing.
This section will then point out the disadvantages the employer
faces with the use of arbitration. First, arbitration may provide no
cost benefit over litigation. Employers also face some uncertainty re-
garding what issues are arbitrable. In addition, opposition to
mandatory arbitration is increasing within the political arena while the
EEOC remains an obstacle for employers.
This section will next address the effects of judicial legislation on
the process of arbitration. This section will argue that arbitrating stat-
utory claims has caused, and continues to cause, arbitration to become
a more complex process, thereby defeating the purpose of providing a
less complicated alternative to litigation. Finally, this section will ad-
dress alternatives to arbitration.
A. Employees Beware
Many argue that forcing an employee or an applicant to waive his
or her right to judicial redress inherently conflicts with the underlying
purposes of the employment discrimination laws.310 One of the main
308. Id.
309. Id. at 26-27 (noting that the percentage of cases going to trial has dropped in sixteen out
of the twenty-two states that reported trial statistics).
310. See Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGis. 281, 290-93 (2002) ("The practice of mandatory, binding arbitration does not com-
port with the purpose and spirit of our nation's civil rights and sexual harassment laws.");
Grodin, supra note 145, at 30-35 ("On their face, therefore, the committee reports provide a
substantial basis for the argument that the Congress which enacted the ADA thought the poli-
cies of that statute would be undermined by precluding judicial enforcement on the basis of a
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arguments asserted by critics of mandatory arbitration is the involun-
tary nature of arbitration agreements. 311 Others argue that the actual
process of arbitrating employment disputes is unequal and thus results
in unfair decisions. 312
1. Mandatory Equals Involuntary
First, the phrase "mandatory arbitration" in itself indicates an invol-
untary standard.313 Mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts are often "blatant contracts of adhesion," presenting a take-
it-or-leave-it approach. 314 Lagatree, for example, when informed by
Luce that the arbitration clause was non-negotiable, was faced with
either accepting the job and waiving his rights or termination. 315
Moreover, often employees or applicants do not know they have
waived these rights until a dispute arises.316
Additionally, some critics of mandatory arbitration stress that the
"barrier to achieving knowing and voluntary consent" is raised when
pre-dispute agreement contained in an employment contract."); Malin, supra note 23, at 95-96
(noting that the FAA contains minimal safeguards, which will be of "limited value" to arbitra-
tion proceedings in the employment context, and thus may undermine the policies behind em-
ployment discrimination statutes); Sternlight, supra note 251, at 330-31 ("In drafting the
legislative reports that accompanied the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress could hardly have
been clearer in stating that the ADR provision was not intended to deny persons their day in
court."); see also Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Employment Task
Force, to Senate on Mandatory Arbitration (May 1, 2002), available at http://www.civilrights.orgl
library/detail.cfmid=8554 (last visited July 8, 2003).
Such mandatory arbitration undermines fundamental principles established by the
hard-fought civil rights battles of the last 30 years. It enables defendants to circumvent
a key federal civil rights protection: the right of job discrimination victims to have their
claims heard by a judge and jury, who have sworn to apply and uphold the law.
Dunlop Commission, supra note 33 (stressing that mandatory arbitration agreements as a condi-
tion of employment should not be enforced and that the choice to use arbitration should be left
to the individual wronged).
311. See Feingold, supra note 310, at 292 (stating that employers are requiring employees to
"submit" to mandatory arbitration in order to resolve employment disputes before they are
hired), Grodin, supra note 145, at 37-38; Taylor, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting Lewis Maltby, presi-
dent of the National Workrights Institute in Princeton, N.J., as stating that if arbitration agree-
ments in employment contracts were voluntary and fair, then "arbitration would be a blessing");
Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Academy of Arbitrators at 15-17, Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-15698).
312. See generally Feingold, supra note 310, at 292; Sternlight, supra note 1, at 676-77; Van
Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 1036.
313. See Reilly, supra note 4, at 1233-35 (arguing that the mandatory arbitration clause is a
"coercive condition of employment"); Taylor, supra note 1, at 5; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1.
at 1037-38 (arguing that the mandatory arbitration clause as condition of employment has be-
come the new "yellow dog contract").
314. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 1037.
315. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
316. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 5.
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arbitration agreements are a condition of employment.31 7 Proponents
of arbitration argue that mandatory arbitration agreements are not
contracts of adhesion because an employee has the choice of seeking
employment elsewhere.318 This argument is illusory, however, be-
cause it "distorts the reality of the bargaining environment. ' 31 9 First,
ADR is an alternative to litigation and not "a choice between working
in a given industry and finding another livelihood. ' 320 Moreover, this
argument ignores the unequal bargaining power between employer
and employee and assumes that the employee has employment
alternatives. 321
Another barrier to achieving a voluntary standard results from the
pre-dispute nature of the agreement. 32 2 The employee, at a minimum,
should have the right to make an informed choice regarding the use of
arbitration after the dispute has arisen. Agreements to arbitrate
claims after the dispute has developed (post-dispute) involve some de-
gree of negotiation and thus are less of a concern than the pre-dispute
agreements. 323 Conversely, an employee signing a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement is often unsure of the rights he or she is waiving and
will often not dedicate time to research something he or she cannot
"change or escape. '324 Whereas post-dispute agreements conform to
the unique characteristics of individual complaints, pre-dispute agree-
ments are applicable to all employees and "magnif[y] their impact
upon the overall implementation of the statutory scheme. '325
Overriding the argument that a mandatory arbitration agreement is
involuntary is the inherently superior bargaining power of the em-
ployer.326 Employers, as "repeat players in the employment market-
place," are experienced at drafting and maintaining employment
contracts. 327 Unlike employers, an employee is a "one-shot player"
with less experience and less knowledge regarding the legal implica-
tions associated with signing an employment contract. 32 8 In addition,
317. Reilly, supra note 4, at 1234; see also Grodin, supra note 145, at 29.
318. Reilly, supra note 4, at 1234.
319. Id.
320. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Res-
olution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1026 (2000); see also Reilly, supra note 4,
at 1234.
321. Reilly, supra note 4, at 1234.
322. Id.
323. Grodin, supra note 145, at 29.
324. Reilly. supra note 4, at 1235; see also Grodin, supra note 145, at 29.
325. Grodin, supra note 145, at 29; see also Reilly, supra note 4, at 1235.
326. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
327. Reilly, supra note 4, at 1236.
328. Id. at 1236.
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an employee lacks the organization, financial support, and sophistica-
tion of an employer. 329
The employer's superior bargaining position also results in an em-
ployment contract drafted with terms favoring the employer.330 Un-
like the employee, the employer has the financial access to hire
attorneys to draft a contract in its self-interest.331 Because an em-
ployee is an inferior player and lacks the bargaining power to negoti-
ate these terms, an employer has little incentive to draft mutually
favorable terms.332 The Dunlop Commission on the Future Worker-
Management Relations expressed this concern in its 1994 report:
We remain very concerned about the potential abuse of ADR cre-
ated by the imbalance of power between employer and employee,
and the resulting unfairness to employees who, voluntarily or other-
wise, submit their disputes to ADR. These concerns are obvious if
the process is controlled unilaterally by employers, such as when
employees are required to sign mandatory arbitration clauses as a
condition of employment .... 333
Additionally, applicants automatically lack bargaining power when
in need of employment.334 As a result, an applicant is left with little
recourse but to waive his or her rights in exchange for financial stabil-
ity.335 Some critics have therefore termed mandatory arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment as the "new yellow dog con-
tract. ' 336 In the early nineteenth century, employers presented appli-
cants with a stipulation that the applicant forgo becoming a union
member in exchange for employment. 337 Like the mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement, the yellow dog contract presented the worker with the
option of either forfeiting the protections of a union or
employment. 338
The one-sidedness of mandatory arbitration agreements is problem-
atic in light of the history of the FAA. Arbitration was initially disfa-
vored in common law because of the one-sidedness of agreeing to
arbitrate future disputes.339 Merchants of equal bargaining power,
however, eventually found arbitration to be a quick and cheap method
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1236-37.
331. Id.
332. Reilly, supra note 4, at 1236-37.
333. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 33, at 54-55.
334. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 676-77.
335. Reilly, supra note 4. at 1233-35; Sternlight, supra note 1, at 676-77.
336. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 1037-38.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. MAcNEIL, supra note 11, at 68-69.
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of resolving their disputes.340 As mentioned, the FAA was originally
drafted in order to provide an alternative to litigation in the commer-
cial environment. 34' The intent behind the adoption of the FAA
therefore contradicts the application of the FAA to a situation, such
as the employer-employee relationship, in which the parties cannot
bargain on equal terms.
2. An Unequal Process
Although arbitration arguably has negative and positive elements
for both the employer and employee,342 the overall effect of an arbi-
tration proceeding favors the employer.343 First, critics of arbitration
of statutory rights argue that arbitrators are not always neutral or
well-versed in the law.344 The procedures and remedial aspects of ar-
bitration also result in due process issues for the employee. 345
a. Is the Arbitrator Neutral?
Many critics of arbitration argue that an arbitrator, unlike a judge
or jury, is less likely to be a neutral decision-maker. 346 Arbitrators are
subject to what some critics have called the "repeat player syn-
drome. ' '347 Because an employer is a more frequent user of arbitra-
340. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126 (2001).
341. Id.
342. Compare Green, supra note 61, at 400-01 ("use of mandatory arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism for employment discrimination claims has failed to give employers an
overall advantage"), with Feingold, supra note 310, at 283-84, 288-92 (describing the due process
inefficiencies inherent in arbitration), and Reilly, supra note 4, at 1209-13 (highlighting the pro-
cedural rights individuals waive by submitting their disputes to arbitration).
343. See Steven E. Abraham & Paula B. Voos, Empirical Data on Employer Gains From
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, LawMemo.com, at http://www.lawmemo.com/
arb/res/empirical.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (study done on effect of the Gilmer decision in
the securities industry, concluding that "the use of binding arbitration systems for the settlement
of legal disputes with employees benefits employers - in other words, there are empirical gains
to employers who institute binding arbitration for their employees"); see also Feingold, supra
note 310, at 284; Reilly, supra note 4, at 1210-13.
344. See Malin, supra note 23, at 95-102; Taylor, supra note 1, at 5. For a recent case regarding
this issue, see Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers, 309
F.3d 1075 (8th Cir. 2002) (overturning the arbitrator's decision because the arbitrator failed to
discuss the language of the agreement and thus did not consider the parties' intent, rendering an
award contrary to the contract).
345. See Feingold, supra note 310, at 288-89; Grodin, supra note 145, at 42-47 (discussing what
is needed to overcome procedural inequalities); Reilly, supra note 4, at 1209-13.
346. See generally Taylor, supra note 1, at 5; see also Susanne Craig, California Duels with
NYSE, NASD, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2002, at C1. This article explains California's effort to
combat lack of arbitrator neutrality through new legislation that requires arbitrators to submit
additional information regarding their financial and professional relationships.
347. Taylor, supra note 1, at 5; see also Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Ct. App.
2002) (Although the arbitration agreement required that the arbitrator be selected from the
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tion, arbitrators are often "reluctant to find against employers or
award large damages for fear of not being invited back. '348  Even
when the parties rely on selection of an arbitrator by a neutral agency
such as the AAA, the employer, as a more frequent user of the
agency, will remain at an advantage as it becomes more familiar with
specific arbitrators and their past decisions. 349
b. Arbitrator v. Judge
One of the arguments made in Gilmer was that allowing a private
arbitrator to determine statutory rights would "impede the develop-
ment of the law."'350 Although the United States Supreme Court dis-
missed this argument, as Professor Malin points out, "[t]he Court's
lack of analysis is most unfortunate because it demonstrates a lack of
appreciation of the different roles of arbitrators and courts and the
impact of those differences on the policies which underlie most em-
ployment statutes. '351
Professor Malin argues that:
Most employment statutes represent congressional determinations
to provide uniform labor standards.... Judges are part of the public
justice system which effectuates these uniform labor standards....
Judges are screened publicly prior to assuming office either through
direct election (in most state courts) or through the nomination and
confirmation process. Their decisions are subject to a hierarchy of
review in higher courts, culminating in review in a Supreme Court.
... Arbitrators, on the other hand, fall outside the public justice
system. They are appointed privately and their decisions are bind-
ing, only on the parties in the actual case. Consequently, unlike
judges, they are not linked together through a unified public justice
system designed to produce a single, socially binding interpretation
of the law. 352
National Arbitration Forum, a neutral agency, the provision called for an arbitrator in the fed-
eral district court where the employee worked. Because there were only eight potential arbitra-
tors in this jurisdiction, the California Court of Appeals was concerned about the "repeat player
effect" and the employee's lack of participation in the selection of the arbitrator and thus found
the arbitration agreement unconscionable.).
348. Taylor, supra note 1, at 5: see also Grodin. supra note 145, at 43-44.
349. Grodin, supra note 145, at 43-44: See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57
(1974). Although applying this rationale to the union context, even the United States Supreme
Court noted that the arbitral process remained inadequate for resolving statutory disputes be-
cause the special role of the arbitrator was to "effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the
requirements of enacted legislation." Id. As a result, the Court reasoned that "[p]arties usually
choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands
and norms of industrial relations." Id.
350. Malin, supra note 23, at 99.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 100-01.
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In addition, an arbitrator is not required to issue a written award.353
As a result, the arbitrator's legal reasoning is not reviewable, making
it "nearly impossible to tell whether the arbitrator paid any attention
to the statutory provisions or common law that governed the case. '354
Another argument that Professor Malin makes is that an arbitra-
tor's misinterpretation of statutory law will "undermine the legislative
policy of setting uniform labor standards. '355 The National Academy
of Arbitrators also argues that an arbitrator's lack of knowledge or
understanding of statutory law results in a forum that is "different,
deficient, and ineffective for adjudicating statutory rights." 356
Even assuming that a judge does not thoroughly understand statu-
tory law, his or her decision is at least subject to judicial review.357
Most courts will only review an arbitrator's decision under limited cir-
cumstances and will only overturn an arbitrator's decision if there is a
"manifest disregard of the law. ' 358
c. The Importance of a Public Forum
Trials, unlike arbitration, produce verdicts that become precedent
for future disputes. 359 Arbitration will therefore hinder the develop-
ment of law and provide little guidance for both the decision-makers
and potential litigants. 360 Although minimizing the amount of litiga-
tion is important, the privatization of disputes will undermine the role
of the legislature in measuring, maintaining, revising, and enacting
meaningful employment statutes.361 In turn, this approach takes "em-
353. See Feingold, supra note 310, at 288; Runkel, supra note 5.
354. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
355. Malin, supra note 23, at 101.
356. Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Academy of Arbitrators at 15-17, Duffield v. Rob-
ertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (1998) (No. 97-15698).
357. Id.
358. See generally Runkel, supra note 5. A recent case highlighting this tension is Greendale
Education Association v. Greendale School District, No. 01-3234, 2002 WL 31455693, at *1 (Wis.
Ct. Ap. Nov. 5, 2002) (per curiam). In this case, the school district fired a physical education
teacher after a number of sexual harassment allegations were filed against him. Id. at *34. The
arbitrator reinstated the teacher, finding that the teacher's conduct did not amount to sexual
harassment. Id. at *4. The trial court found that the arbitrator's decision was unsupported and
resulted in a decision contrary to public policy concerning the protection of the students. Id. at
*4-5. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the arbi-
trator's decision was not contrary to public policy because the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority in holding a de novo hearing and making factual findings. Id. at *14-15.
359. Samborn, supra note 307, at 26.
360. Id.
361. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 1043.
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ployment concerns out of the public arena, away from public scrutiny
and political accountability. '362
Although many cases settle before reaching trial, critics of arbitra-
tion argue that the cases that do reach trial serve an important educa-
tional role.363  Trials create an "open forum," providing an
opportunity for the public to understand how the law works.364 As
more disputes are privatized, however the risk of the public becoming
more detached from the legal system will increase. 365
A public verdict also serves a critical role in deterring employers
from future discriminatory conduct. 366 Although some may argue that
a private decision benefits both employer and employee, many indi-
viduals may want an opportunity to have his or her day in court. 367 At
a minimum, an agreement to arbitrate should be entered into volunta-
rily and should not be mandatory to preserve these pillars of the
American judicial system.
d. Due Process Issues
Mandatory arbitration has become problematic because it under-
mines the fundamental constitutional right to a trial by jury.368 In a
recent Montana Supreme Court decision striking down a contractual
arbitration clause, 369 Justice William Leaphart, in concurrence, em-
phasized the importance of this right:
Given the sacredness and inviolability of the fundamental right to
trial by jury, any contract provision that openly or subtly causes the
forfeiture of the exercise of this right must be rigorously examined
by the courts.... Indeed, the use of such contractual provisions is at
one and the same time an 'open attack' on the right of jury trial and
a 'secret machination' causing forfeiture of that right that [Justice
William] Blackstone predicted would 'sap and undermine' the right,
and with our 'public and private liberties.' 370
362. Id.; see also Samborn, supra note 307, at 26 ("Private dispute resolution also shields law-
suits from the imposition of public values about important concerns, such as discrimination in
the workplace . . .'To the extent that these cases are tried, the values behind those statutes are
vindicated in a public forum . . .'").
363. Samborn, supra note 307, at 26.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Taylor, supra note 1, at 5.
367. Samborn, supra note 307, at 27.
368. See Feingold, supra note 310, at 288.
369. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002). Although this case involved the
use of a mandatory arbitration clause in an agreement between a financial services company and
a client, the court's general distaste for mandatory arbitration clauses (in situations where there
cannot be a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to trial by jury) is important to the study
of the use of arbitration clauses in all contexts. Id. at 7-8, 10-17.
370. Id. at 12.
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Moreover, the 1991 Civil Rights Act expressly protects the right to
trial by jury in Title VII and ADA claims.371
Although the Supreme Court has articulated that by arbitrating a
statutory claim an individual does not "forgo" his or her substantive
rights, 372 some argue that depriving an individual's right to access the
courts "could lead to the inequitable application of substantive
law."'373 As Senator Russell Feingold explains:
Under the FAA, arbitrators are not required to apply the particular
federal or state law that would be applied by a court. This enables
the stronger party to use arbitration to circumvent laws specifically
enacted to regulate the parties' relationship in a particular jurisdic-
tion. Circumventing these laws is inequitable and eliminates their
deterrent effects.374
In Lai, the Ninth Circuit also recognized that in some instances,
such as Title VII sexual harassment claims, the forum may substan-
tially affect the outcome of the trial. 375 The Lai court stated: "[I]n an
area as personal and emotionally charged as sexual harassment and
discrimination, the procedural right to a hearing before a jury of one's
peers, rather than a panel of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, may be especially important." 376
e. Other Procedural Issues
The right to a jury trial also guarantees certain procedural safe-
guards absent in an arbitration proceeding. 377 The Supreme Court
summarized some of the deficiencies of arbitration in Gardner-
Denver:
[T]he fact-finding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial fact-finding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is
not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights
and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compul-
sory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are
often severely limited or unavailable.378
The lack of these procedural formalities is, in fact, what makes arbitra-
tion a more efficient, simplified process. 379
371. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
372. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122-23 (2001).
373. Feingold, supra note 310, at 288.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305 n. 4 (1994).
377. See generally Feingold, supra note 310, at 288; Reilly, supra note 4, at 1209-12.
378. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974); see also Feingold, supra note
310, at 288; Reilly, supra note 4, at 1209-12.
379. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
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Some of these procedural differences disadvantage the employee.380
For example, California's rules of evidence limit the admissibility of
evidence relating to a plaintiff's sexual background in a judicial pro-
ceeding. In an arbitration proceeding, an employee with a sexual dis-
crimination claim is not afforded the protection inherent with this rule
of evidence. 381
f. Limited Remedies
Arbitration also results in smaller awards for an employee. 382 For
example, arbitrators will usually not award punitive damages, and, in
some states, punitive damages are prohibited altogether. 383 Punitive
damages are significant in deterring employers, and, absent this rem-
edy, an employer is unlikely to change its discriminatory behavior. 38 4
In addition, a jury trial will produce a higher award for the employee
because jurors, unlike the arbitrator, are more sympathetic to the
employee. 385
g. Fee Sharing
Another issue for employees is that arbitration often entails fee
sharing.386 Many arbitration agreements require the parties to split
the cost of the arbitrator and the arbitration proceeding. 38 7 The cost
of arbitration is sometimes significant. Arbitrator fees alone often
amount to $750 to $1,000 a day.388 Arbitration costs also include filing
fees and other administrative costs beyond what is normally associ-
ated with court services. 3 9
Fee sharing can act as a huge deterrent for an individual in situa-
tions in which an arbitration agreement requires the parties to make
payments prior to the proceedings. 390 In Green Tree Financial Corp.-
380. Feingold, supra note 310, at 288.
381. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305; see also Reilly, supra note 4, at 1211-12.
382. See Reilly, supra note 4, at 1211-12 (finding that "the mean damages awarded by arbitra-
tors from 1993-1995 was $49,030 compared to $530,611 by district courts," and that "the median
jury award in discrimination and sexual harassment cases alone was $250,000"); Taylor, supra
note 1, at 5 (finding that arbitration awards were "20 percent the amount a court would award").
383. Reilly, supra note 4, at 1211-12.
384. See generally Reilly, supra note 4, at 1211-12 (punitive damages are awarded more often
in employment cases and thus play a critical role); Taylor, supra note 1, at 5 ("[W]ithout the
threat of bad publicity or large jury awards, businesses have no deterrent from allowing discrimi-
nation to occur.").
385. Taylor, supra note 1, at 5.
386. Id.; see generally Runkel, supra note 5.
387. Taylor, supra note 1, at 5; see generally Runkel, supra note 5.
388. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
389. Id.
390. Taylor, supra note 1, at 5.
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Alabama v. Randolph, the Supreme Court addressed the fee sharing
issue in a non-employment context and held that "where ... a party
seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbi-
tration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden
of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs." 391
The lower courts, however, remain divided on this issue. 392 Some
courts have held that an employee should not have to pay any ex-
penses of an arbitrator when a statutory claim is at issue. 393 Although
other courts have held that an employee should not pay for any "un-
reasonable costs" associated with arbitration, what is "unreasonable"
remains undefined. 394 Most courts, however, analyze each case differ-
ently and take into consideration "the employee's personal ability to
pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential be-
tween arbitration and litigation, and whether that cost differential is
so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims. 395
B. Is Arbitration Really a Better Alternative for Employers?
Like employees, employers also face certain disadvantages in the
use of mandatory arbitration as an alternative dispute mechanism. 396
Employers face obstacles such as the increasing cost of arbitration,
uncertainties as to what is arbitrable, and political opposition to
mandatory arbitration agreements. 397  Most importantly, the EEOC
has recently gained a substantial victory in its fight against mandatory
arbitration agreements. 398
1. Is There Any Cost Benefit to Arbitration?
Despite the professed benefits of arbitration, until recently, no inde-
pendent research had ever been done to support this conclusion.399 In
391. 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000); see also Runkel, supra note 5.
392. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
393. Id.; see also Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Shankle v. B-G Maint.
Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc.,
134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
394. See generally Runkel, supra note 5; see also Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-84.
395. See generally Runkel, supra note 5; see also Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys..
Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
396. See generally Green, supra note 61, at 401-02.
397. Id.
398. See EEOC v. Wafflehouse, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that the EEOC can recover
damages and other relief on behalf of an employee who signed a mandatory arbitration
agreement).
399. Public Citizen, Cost of Arbitration: Executive Summary (May 1, 2002), available at http://
www.lawmemo.com/arb/res/cost.htm (last visited July 8, 2003); see also Green, supra note 61, at
421-24. Professor Green notes that not many studies have been done regarding the cost savings
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May 2002, Public Citizen released a report indicating that arbitration
can be more costly than litigation. 400 In summary, Public Citizen
found that
initiating an arbitration is almost always higher than the cost of in-
stituting a lawsuit; forum costs . . . can be up to five thousand per-
cent higher in arbitration than in court litigation .... Arbitration
costs are high under a pre-dispute arbitration clause because there
is no price competition among providers .... Arbitration costs will
probably always be higher than court costs in any event, because the
expenses of a private legal system are so substantial .... Arbitration
saddles claimants with a plethora of extra fees that they would not
be charged if they went to court .... Taking a case to arbitration
does not guarantee that a[n] . . . employee will stay out of court,
making arbitration still more costly.40 1
2. Arbitrability Issues
Although the United States Supreme Court has adopted a liberal
policy in favor of arbitration, what exactly is arbitrable remains un-
clear.40 2 Employers (and employees for that matter) will most likely
continue to face this uncertainty until Congress takes action. 403 Addi-
tionally, an employer may still face judicial hostility toward the use of
a mandatory arbitration provision in an employment contract as lower
courts are beginning to challenge the fairness of such agreements. 40 4
A national employer will also have the additional burden of drafting
arbitration agreements that will meet both federal law requirements
and the provisions of each state in which the employer conducts
business. 405
of arbitration, but that "[tihe little data ... that does exist supports the position that arbitration
may not be as big a savings in cost or time as proponents claim." Id. at 422. He cites one
example that involved an arbitration proceeding originating from a pre-dispute clause that lasted
seven years and cost the company approximately $100 million. Id. at 422-23.
400. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
401. Id. The report also concludes that in some instances, the high cost of arbitration can
work to the advantage of the employer. Id. For example, the party being sued may file a motion
to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. Id. The claimant then has to provide the funds up
front for the arbitrator to decide on the motion, which in turn, may force a claimant unable to
pay to abandon his or her case early in the proceedings. Id.
402. Green, supra note 61, at 418.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 428-32. For a good illustration of this situation, see Cole v. Burns International
Securities Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this case, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit established minimum standards an employer must
meet in order to have an enforceable arbitration agreement. Id. at 1482-83.
405. See generally Runkel. supra note 5.
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3. The Political Pull
The political arena is also critical of mandatory arbitration. 40 6 For
example, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and
the NYSE became a target of civil rights groups due to their use of
mandatory arbitration agreements. 40 7 As a result, members of Con-
gress pressured the NASD and the NYSE into "banning their long-
standing requirements of mandatory arbitration. 40 8  Political
representatives such as Senator Russell D. Feingold are also taking
affirmative steps in Congress to eradicate mandatory arbitration in
many contexts. 40 9
4. The EEOC Barrier
The most "significant deterrent" an employer faces in the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements is the EEOC.410 The Supreme
Court recently held in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. that a signed
mandatory arbitration agreement between an employer and employee
did not prohibit the EEOC from independently suing and seeking vic-
tim-specific relief on behalf of the employee. 411  Remedies that the
EEOC can obtain include reinstatement, back pay, front pay, and
both compensatory and punitive damages. 412 Prior to Waffle House,
the circuits were split regarding the ability of the EEOC to recover
damages and other relief on behalf of an employee who had signed a
mandatory arbitration agreement.41 3 As Justice Clarence Thomas rea-
soned in dissent, the holding in Waffle House will discourage the use
406. Id. at 427-28.
407. Id.
408. Green, supra note 61, at 427.
409. See generally Feingold, supra note 310, at 292-93, 295, 297. In 1994, Senator Feingold
introduced the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act "which aims to preserve the right to take
employment discrimination claims to court." Id. at 292. In 2001, Feingold, along with other
Senators, introduced the Civil Rights Act of 2001. Id. at 292-93. This Act would amend the civil
rights statutes including claims arising under Title VII, ADA, EPA, FMLA, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, and the FAA. Id. at 293. The amendment would allow only for arbitration based
on voluntary terms after the claim arises. Id. In addition, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-
Ohio) and thirty-seven other members of Congress have submitted a proposal to amend the
FAA to require the exemptions of all employment contracts from arbitration provisions. Id.
Feingold has also introduced bills prohibiting mandatory arbitration agreements in the automo-
bile industry and with consumer credit agreements. Feingold, supra note 306, at 295, 297.
410. Green, supra note 61, at 432.
411. 534 U.S. at 287.
412. Id.
413. Compare EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
arbitration agreement limited the remedies the EEOC could seek), and EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (EEOC could pursue injunctive relief but not mone-
tary relief), with EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (arbitra-
tion agreement does not bar EEOC from seeking injunctive relief, back pay, and damages).
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of arbitration agreements in the employment context and argued that
employers like Waffle House
will be worse off in cases where the EEOC brings an enforcement
action should it continue to utilize arbitration agreements in the fu-
ture. This is because it will face the prospect of defending itself in
two different forums against two different parties seeking precisely
the same relief. It could face the EEOC in court and the employee
in an arbitral forum. 4 1 4
C. Arbitrating Statutory Claims Defeats the Purpose of ADR
Although arbitration is a simple concept, the judicial rewriting of
the legislative history behind the FAA has resulted in "a defective
product. '' 415 The use of mandatory arbitration agreements in the em-
ployment context and the litigation, not arbitration, that has flowed
from the controversies surrounding the enforceability of these agree-
ments is a clear illustration of how arbitration has become a complex
process. As Professor MacNeil concluded, the judicial decisions re-
garding arbitration "tend to be fundamentally aimless, meandering,
and above all, confusing. They are hence dysfunctional in terms of
both the policies being achieved and of legal efficiency. '416
D. Alternatives to Arbitration
Other forms of ADR are also available for resolving employment
disputes.4 17 Mediation, for example, provides a more neutral environ-
ment to resolve employment disputes.418 Like arbitration, mediation
involves a neutral party in the resolution of the dispute. 419 Unlike
arbitration, mediation is a voluntary process in which both parties
"are free to walk away at any time. ' 420 The mediator does not issue
an award but helps the parties reach a mutual agreement.421 The par-
ties may complete their agreement by signing a contract and, if no
agreement is reached, litigation or arbitration remains an option. 422
Lagatree and Luce, for example, may have never reached litigation
if mediation was employed. In this case, neither party appeared will-
414. 534 U.S. at 309.
415. MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 171.
416. Id. at 172.
417. See generally STONE, supra note 8, at 5; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
418. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See generally Runkel, supra note 5.
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ing to compromise.423 Whereas Lagatree felt the mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement was unfair,424 Luce argued the agreement was non-
negotiable. 425 The mandatory nature of the agreement and Luce's im-
mediate and blatant refusal to negotiate with Lagatree confirmed
Lagatree's fears that, as an employee of Luce, his civil liberties were
at stake. 426 The parties in the case did not make an effort to break the
deadlock and, instead, headed for the courtroom.427
Mediation would have provided an opportunity for Lagatree and
Luce to reach a mutual agreement without automatically defaulting to
costly litigation. The mediator would have consulted both sides and
established a detailed understanding of the respective positions. A
neutral perspective may have brought the parties to an understanding.
Perhaps Luce's agreement to mediate, alone, would have mitigated
Lagatree's fears and concerns by undermining the firm's initial will-
ingness to negotiate. Even if no agreement was reached, both parties
would have retained their right to sue.
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitration offers an efficient and cost-effective alternative to liti-
gation in certain contexts. The FAA was enacted in an effort to
quickly resolve commercial disputes between merchants. Since the
FAA was passed, however, the use of arbitration has expanded to con-
texts not originally considered in the adoption of the FAA. As a re-
sult, both the United States Supreme Court and the lower courts have
faced new questions regarding the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments as applied in these various situations.
The use of mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment
context, in particular, has resulted in a sharply divided debate. The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether the use of a
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreement in an employment con-
tract or application is enforceable when statutory claims are at issue.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
originally resolved this issue in Duffield, the Luce court overruled
Duffield and joined in the judicial effort to clear court dockets. Simi-
lar to Professor MacNeil's characterization of the Supreme Court's
decisions regarding arbitration, the Ninth Circuit decision in Luce rep-
resents "bureaucratic formalism" where "never are the basic goals of
423. Luce, 303 F.3d at 997-98.
424. Id. at 997.
425. Id. at 998.
426. Id. at 997-98.
427. Id. at 998.
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the law thoroughly examined and comprehensively addressed. In-
stead the Supreme Court examines bits and pieces, the flotsam and
jetsam of [the] particular case. 42 8
The outcome of Luce is wrong and conflicts with an employee's
right to judicial redress of his or her statutory claims. An employment
contract that requires an individual to agree to arbitration as a condi-
tion of employment is inherently unequal and leaves the individual
little or no choice. Although the use of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation has potentially positive and negative elements for both em-
ployer and employee, the positive factors weigh in favor of the em-
ployer. Moreover, the judicial decision-making regarding arbitration
in the employment context has undermined, and continues to under-
mine, the purpose of providing an efficient and cost-effective alterna-
tive to litigation.
Other forms of ADR, such as mediation, may present a better alter-
native for both employer and employee. Mediation still offers an em-
ployer an alternative to litigation and yet provides the employee with
a more voluntary process of resolving his or her dispute. Additionally,
the employee who was wronged by his or her employer may still pre-
serve the right to enforce his or her civil rights in a judicial forum.
Nicole Karas
428. MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 171.
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